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NEGRO TROOPS IN THE CIVIL WAR
INTRODUCTION
On the nineteenth of April, 1661, the negro was not looked upon
as a possible military factor in the coming struggle between the
North and the South. The cause of the war he might have been, al-
though it was not the policy of the Federal Jovernraent to make any
such admission. In accordance with this firm intent and purpose of
the Government to make the issue not that of Slavery but of union or
disunion surely, nothing could have been more inharmonious and con-
tradictory than trie use of negro troops. Such few suggestions as to
the arming of colored men as came at that time to the Government
were disregarded or dismissed with the answer that the War Department
had no intention of calling into Government service any colored
soldiers} Certainly no one in high official position would have at
that time suggested the arming of the black race as the means by
which the rebellion might be most "certainly, speedily and econom-
pically" suppressed, as did Secretary Chase less than two years later.'
Tor would the proposition have been favorably viewed even without
this political drawback, for the place of the negro in the scheme of
evolution was not highly rated, and the idea that a plantation slave
could be transformed into a courageous and effective soldier was one
to be riaiculed or scorned. The possibility of teaching the negro
the duties of a soldier, or of his adhering to that teaching in
actual warfare were equally matters of doubt.
At the beginning of the war then, the t rmy was composed wholly
1. War Records, Serial No. 122, pp. 77, 107, 133.
2. warden, Chase, 514.
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2of white troops, and negroes were excluded "by the regulations which
provided that any "free white male person above the age of eighteen
might be enlisted'C The status of the negro was in no way
different from what it had been before the outbreak of the war, nor
was there any apparent movement in Government circles toward the im-
provement of that status. Not only was any positive attempt to in-
jure the "institution" frowned upon, but the fugitive slave law was
enforced with what vigor official commands could inject into it.
On the twenty third of April, Brigadier General Benjamin F. Butler
wrote to Governor Hicks of Maryland; "I have understood, within the
last hour, that some apprehensions were entertained of an insurrec-
tion of thenegro population of this neighborhood. I am anxious to
convince all classes of persons that the forces under my command are
not here in any way to interfere with, or countinance any interfer-
ence with, the laws of the State. I am, therefore, ready to coop-
erate with your excellency in suppressing, most promptly and effect-
ively, any insurrection against the laws of I'aryland." General
McClellan in his first advance made an equally emphatic proclamation
of protection, In it he said; "Notwithstanding all that has been
said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent
among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves, under-
stand one thing olearly--not only will we abstain from all such .
interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush
any attempt at insurrection on their part." General Halleck forbade
the admission of negro slave within the lines except when especially
ordered by the general commanding. General Sherman said "ray orders
are that all negroes shall be delivered upon the claim of the owner
or agent". Speaking on the same subject, General Buell said that in
3. War Records, Serial No. 126, p. 654.

every instance of wti ich he knew, where applications had "been made by
persons whose slaves had found their way into the camps, he master
had secured his servant and taken him away. The attitude of military
leaders was in the main that this was a question with which they had
nothing to do. It was a matter for the courts to decide, and no
4
policy was open to them "but that of obedience to existing laws.
But uniformity of action could not be expected, and there were
soon those, who, either by reason of personal feeling or force of
circumstances, took a different stand. General Fremont on the
thirtieth of August, 1861, electri fied the country by incorporating
in his proclamation of martial law throughout the state of Missouri
a clause confiscating all property, real or personal, belonging to
those persons who should take up arms against the United States, and
declaring the slaves of such persons free. President Lincoln im-
mediately asked a modification of this proclamation, urging the un-
favorable effect it could not fail to produce in the border States,
but Fremont obdurately refused to make the requested changes without
a specific order to do so. The order came forthwith on the tenth of
September, and the necessary revisions were made. b The stories of
discussion which the Fremont order and its subsequent modification
caused, while for the most part Public Opinion was in sympathy with
Lincoln's action, yet showed clearly enough that the Negro could not
be icept out of the War with any degree of success.
As the war progressed and the Federal armies moved southward,
this fact became more and more evident to military leaders at least.
4. war Records, Serial No. 2, pp. 305,48.
Serial No. 4, pp. 307, 347.
Serial No. 5, p. 431.
Serial No. 9, p. 364.
See also Sutherland, The negro in the Late War,
./ar Papers read before the Commandery of State of
Wisconsin, I, 166.
5 . War Records, Serial No. 3, pp. 467,469, 477,485.

4Instead of an occasional fugitive from some rebel plantation or camp,
negroes were corning to the Federal lines in numbers that made im-
possible, from a humanitarian point of view, a continuance of the
summary policy of refusing these admittance. where it had "been a
comparatively simple matter to turn one runaway slave over to a
pursuing master, it was an entirely different proposition to return
half a dozen families, to masters who would send the women and chil-
dren South and put the able bodied men to work upon the plantations
which were provisioning the Southern forces . The growing realiza-
tion that the negroes were a valuable military asset to the South,
and the knowledge that they were being used in the building of the
fortifications and breast works against which T.orthern troops would
soon be sent, was undoubtedly effective in accelerating the adoption
of a new policy by the North. That the negroes were so used there
can be no question. The fact was gleefully flaunted in the faces
of Eurthe rn abolitionists who were wont to declaim over the sad life
of the slave and his supreme desire for freedom, that negroes were
making voluntary offer of their services to the Confederate Govern-
ment for just such labor 7 . It was not long before Northern Generals
were making similar use of fugitive negroes. The struggle of the
Federal Government to maintain its much-emphasized- policy of non-
interference, while at the same time it recognized the wisdom and
6. War Records, Serial No. 2, p. 55, ibid., Serial No. 122, p. 708.
7. Greeley, American Conflict, II, 521. Quoting Charleston Mercury,
January 3, 1861.
ibid., Quoting Memphis Avalanche, September ?,, 1851.
.illiams, History of : egro Troops, II, 8. Quoting Charleston
Mercury, April 30, 1861.
ibid., quoting Memphis Appeal, May 9, 10, 11, 1861.

practicability of the use of fugitives is admirably illustrated in
a letter of May thirtieth, 1651, from Secretary of War Cameron to
General Butler. He says; "The Department is sensible of the em-
barassrnent which must surround officers conducting military oper-
ations in a state by the laws of which slavery is sanctioned.
r; he Government cannot recognise the rejection by any State of
its Federal obligations, nor can it refuse performance of Vederal
obligations resting upon itself. Among these Federal obligations,
however, no one can be more important than that of suppressing and
dispersing armed combinations formed for the purpose of overthrowing
its whole constitutional authority.
While, therefore, you will permit no interference by the persons
under your command with the relations of persons held to service
under laws of any State, you will, on the other hand, so long as any
State within which your military operations are conducted is under
the control of such armed combinations, refrain from surrendering to
alleged masters any person who may come within your lines. You will
employ such persons in the services to which they may be best
adapted"
.
In August of that year, Congress passed its first anti- slave ry
measure, the act of August sixth, confiscating property used for
insurrectionary purposes and making free slaves used by the rebel
forces. Senator Trumbull of Illinois introduced the bill on the
twentieth of July, offering as an amendment the section giving free-
don to slaves used for military purposes. After a more or less
heated debate, in which Senators
r
:rumbull of Illinois, Fessenden of
Laine, and Wilson Of Massachusetts led the discussion for the bill,
and Breckenridge of Kentucky and Pearce of Maryland the opposition,
8. War Records, Serial No. 122, p. 24 3.

6the "bill passed with a vote of thirty three to six. It was taken up
in the House of Representatives August second. Here as in the
Senate the representatives of the "border States met it with deter-
mined opposition, "but with some changes which did not destroy the
original purpose of the measure, it passed, although the proportion
of votes in its favor was not so high as it had "been in the Senate.
On the sixth of the month it received the approval of President
9Lincoln and "became law.
In accordance with this changing policy, Secretary of War
Cameron included in his directions to General Sherman, when the
latter went soutii in October, instructions to avail himself of the
services of any persons, whether fugitive from labor or not, who
1
should offer themselves to the National Government . These
instructions were destined to prove the "basis for much acrimonious
controversy later, on the question of whether they did or did not
sanction the arming of negroes, but at the time they were effective
in meeting the point then at issue, the admission to the lines and
use of fugitives, or their return to southern claimants. No unfair
advantage seems to have "been taken by General Sherman of their mean-
ing. A second piece of legislation settled the matter once for all
in the spring of 1362, a measure prohibiting all officers or persons
in the military or naval service of the United States from employing
any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of
returning fugitive slaves^.
Once the use- of fugitive negroes as laborers was firmly estab-
lished as legitimate, it is not to be wondered at that certain more
9. uil?on, Anti Slavery Measures in Congress, 1-16.
10. War Records, Serial No. 6, p. 176.
11. Wilson, Antislavery Measures in Congress, 17-37.
i
adventurous spirits should rush on to the next step, that of arming
them as soldiers. During the spring and summer of 1862 there were
three such attempts, under the leadership respectively of Generals
Hunter, Butler, and Lane.

8I
EIRST ATTEMPTS AT THE USE OF NEGRO TROOPS
In March, the states of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida
with the forces then under Brigadier General W. S. Sherman were con-
stituted a military department, to he called the "Department of the
South, and to he under the command of ". aj or General Hunter. Along
with the department, General Hunter fell heir to the instructions by
which General Sherman had governed his relations with the negroes.
General Hunter was in no sense a strict constructionist, and pro-
ceeded to put into effect the broadest interpretations of the lav/
and of his orders. April thirteenth he issued a proclamation freeing
negroes held to service against the United States Government "by
2
rebels witain a certain district of his department . Had he taxen
no further emancipatory measures, his course could have been justi-
fied under the Confiscation Act of August, 1861, which authorized
the freeing of slaves held to labor against the Federal Government.
But this was only the beginning of a series of acts which stirred
intense feeling not only in the Department of the South, but through-
out the country, ""ay ninth the famous emancipation proclamation de-
claring free all negroes held as slaves within the three states of
Georgia, Florida and South Carolina, was p romulgated as General Order
No. 11. It shared the fate of General Fremont's similar pronounce-
ment, and was revoked by President Lincoln's order on the ninteenth
3
of the same month.
1. War Records, Serial No. 6, p. 248.
2. War Records, Serial tio. 20, p. 333.
3. ibid., p. 341. Serial No. 123, pp. 42-43.

9The excitement and discussion which accompanied this emancipa-
tion proclamation was almost immediately swallowed up in a greater
agitation. The rumor spread rapidly through the country that General
Hunter was organizing and arming a regiment of "black troops. Truth
lay behind the disturbing rumor. The headquarters of the Department
of the South were at Port Royal, South Carolina. In the immediate
vicinity were numerous abandoned plantations, which were being
worked for the Government by the abandoned slaves, under the direct
tion of the Treasury Department. Then slaves were also used as
officer's servants and in the Quarter Master's Department. General
Hunter was charged with the duty of guarding the entire seacoast
from South Carolina to Florida, and felt the need of ; ore troops
than the sixteen thousand then under his command. Applications for
reenforceraents met the answer that the operations in the peninsular
campaign demanded all available troops, and that none could be spared
for the Department of the South. 4 The idea of arming the negroes
suggested itself as a possible remedy for this unfavorable state of
affairs, and General Hunter was not the type cf man to hesitate too
long for fear of adverse Public Opinion or a possible stretching of
his oraers.
According to one account, General Hunter called into consulta-
tion with him, on this new project, a certain negro preacher called
Abram Murchison, a man who exercised considerable influence among
the blacks. As early as the seventh of April, al i the male negroes
were called together for a discussion of the subject of their arming.
The matter v/as kept quiet, a fact significant in itself, only two
white men, both in Government employ, attending the meeting.
4. ibid., pp. 337, 350.
Serial No. 6, pp. 254, 263.

10
Murchison addressed the assembly, explained what were the difficul-
ties in the situation, and finally asked all those willing to take
up arras in defence of the Government and of themselves, to rise.
The response was instantaneous and unanimous. Some hundred negroes
were enrolled as willing to "bear arms 5 . whatever the truth or
falsity of this account, it is certain that General Hunter had the
plan under consideration, and early in May took steps for carrying
it out.
He "based his authority for such a step on the letter of instruc-
tion which General Sherman had received, and which had "been trans-
ferred to aim at the time of his appointment as commander in the new
department. The controverted clause followed a general authori-
zation for the use of negroes as "ordinary employes," and sanctioned
their use "if special circumstances seem to require it, in any other
capacity, with such organization (in squads, companies, or other-
wise)" as he might "deem most beneficial to the service; this, how-
ever, not being a general arming of them for military service."
Just the extent of the authority here conferred might very properly
be a matter for some doubt. The language is far from specific. The
prohibition of a "general" arming might lead to the conclusion that
in the "special circumstances" alluded to, a special arming might be
permissible, "^ut that still left undefined the terms "general", and
"special circumstances". In view of the policy of the Government at
the time the instructions were issued, (October 1861) and their re-
fusal to accept any of the offers of negro troops which made their
way to the War Department, one is obliged to conclude that the only
5. gew York Times, May 1, 1662. Letter signed. J . M . W.
6. «var Records, Serial Ho. 6, p. 176.

arming of negroes which would have "been considered within the limits
of Governmental approbation, would have "been confined to individual
case s and for purposes of protection merely. General Sherman made
no attempt to emlarge the probable meaning of the instructions.
But General Hunter found in them what seemed to nim full author-
ity, and proceeded to the recruiting and orgainzation of ais black
troops. Kis immediate plan was the organization of two regiments,
to be officered by the best non-commissioned officers to be found in
the Department. Sergeant G. T. Trowbridge, of the New York Volunteer
Engineers was appointed Captain of the first company of this proposed
first regiment, on the seventh of May, 1862. He with two others,
was detailed for recruiting duty. It was General Hunter's intention
that the new regiments should be in all respects on an equality with
the white troops. Pay, food, clothing, and drill were to be the
same, and recruiting officers received instructions to make their
proposition to the blacks on that basis. Jules de la Croix, one of
the Treasury agents in charge of contrabands, was put in charge of
7the examination and enrollment of Volunteers.
the
The enlistments did not progress with»rapidity for which General
Hunter had hoped. Eames came in slowly. If a hundred negroes had
testified their willingness to bear arras in a secret meeting on April
seventh, they were unwilling to prove that desire a month later, when
the opportunity was offered by a recruiting officer rather than by
one of their own leaders. General Hunter had acted largely from a
theoretical point of view as to the attitude the negroes would take,
and had neither wide personal observation nor testimony from the
Treasury agents to back that theory. He had counted on their readi-
7. War Records, Serial No. 123, pp. 29-20.
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ness to take side with the North against their masters, "he
Treasury agents could have told him that there was a gener&X distrust
of the Federal authorities among the contrabands, a distrust due to
the lurid pictures their masters had taken care to paint, of the fate
awaiting any black man unfortunate enough to fall into Yankee hands.
That they were to be worked without pay, or sold into Cuba, were
among the mildest of these threats. Wo wonder that the negroes held
Q
aloof from military organization.
There was another reason equally potent, when the news went
out among the white soldiers that negro troops were to be organized,
it met with general disapproval, and they proceeded to put what
hindrances they could in the way of a successful accomplishment of
the undertakings. The stories of dire things to come, told the
contrabands by the rebels, were echoed and elaborated upon by the
white soldiers. rihey were contemptuous of the abilities of the
negroes, and would not face the indignity of their establishment on
a plane of technical equality. 9
These were not insurmo untable obstacles. With a steady adher-
ence to the quiet policy with wnich the recruiting began, an insist-
ence on the principle of voluntary enlistment, the doubts and fears
of the contrabands would have given way to confidence. Put this
would have taken more time than General Hunter cared to devote to the
organization of his first regiment, and he rashly adopted a policy
of impressment. Without consultation, either with his Brigadier
Generals or the contraband agents, he sent out a peremptory order to
8. ibid., pp. 52-53.
C. Kigginson, Army Life in a "lack Regiment, 272-273.
9. New York v imes, Aug. 22, 1862. Letter from the Hilton Head
Correspondent, Aug. 15, 1862.
S. v/. Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, 272

1?
the various district commanders, requiring the return to his head-
quarters, then at Hilton Head, of all able bodied negroes capable of
bearing arras. The order was forthwith passed on to the plantation
superintendents through the special agent of the Treasury Department,
Mr. Pierce.
The latter saw clearly the undesirable effects certain to
follow such an order. Not only would the contrabands be frightened
into even deeper suspicion and distrust of the Government, but this
general impressment of men from the plantations would be disastrous
to their success, and the forty thousand dollars invested therein
would be wasted. All these considerations he embodied in a letter
to General Hunter, and later reviewed with him personally. General
Hunter, although denying his intention to take the negroes against
their will, and promising that after receiving "free papers'1 at
Hilton Head they should be given the opportunity to return to the
plantations if they desired, nevertheless refused to revoke the im-
pressment order. 10 In view of the fact that General Rufus Ssxton
had on the twenty ninth of .April received his assignment to duty in
the Department, with special .jurisdiction over plantations and
contrabands, and was shortly expected, his action seems the more
premature . 1
The impressment was carried out as rapidly as possible. Compa-
nies of soldiers were detailed for the disagreeable duty and all the
able bodied between eighteen and forty five who had not succeeded in
making their escape or secreting themselves safely, were brot into
Hilton Head. Destressing scenes accompanied the departure of the
10. War Records, Serial No. 123, pp. 50-56.
11. ibid., pp. 27,56.
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files of negroes. They themselves were reluctant, uneasy; their
wives and children wept and moaneu, giving vent to their feelings
in the usual unrestrained and passionate fashion of the negro.
Plantation superintendents, helpless in the face of orders from head-
quarters, unwillingly gave their assistance to the squads of guards,
and did what they could to reassure the suspicious captives and theii
12
agonized families.
This was not an auspicious beginning for a venture which would
have had enough obstacles to face at the "best. For three months
General Hunter persisted in the attempt. The regiment was organized,
under the name of First South Carolina Volunteers. Officers were
I
appointed, some difficulty "being faced in the selection of men suit-
able for such positions who were willing to face the opprobrium
unavoidably connected with the unpopular project, and drill began,
in spite of ridicule and insult from the white soldiers. The one
cheering thing about the matter was the responsiveness of the
negroes to drill. They showed an adaptability which was something
1 x
of a surprise to those who had been most hopeful.* •
But the regiment had no sound legal standing. However firmly
General Hunter might convince himself that its organization was
justified by his orders, that conviction was not shared by the
Federal Government. June fifth, Mr. Wickliffe of Kentucky intro-
duced into the House a resolution asking that the Secretary of War
be directed to inform the House whether or not a regiment of "fugi-
12. War Records, Serial No. 125, pp. 57-60
13. Lew York Times, Special correspondent, June 15, 1862.
June 27, 1862.
August 26, 1862.
C. General Hunter's letter.
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tive slaves" had actually "been formed under General Hunter's super-
vision, and if so, whether he was authorized to muster them into the
United States service. There were further questions as to the
14
supplying of arms and equipment for the regiment. " The resolution
was adopted and referred to Secretary Stanton, who on the fourteenth
replied that the Department had no official information as to the
'organization of any such regiment, and that the muster of fugitive
slaves as soldiers was not authorized by the United States Govern-
ment, and that no arms had "been furnished to he placed in the hands
of "those slaves." A copy of the House resolution was duly for-
warded to General Hunter with a request for an immediate report.
The report, as submitted by Secretary Stanton some two weeks later,
is perhaps worth quoting as showing clearly General Hunter's atti-
15
tude on the matter of arming negroes.
"Headquarters Department of the South,
Port Royal, S. C, June 23, 1862.
Hon. Edwin M. Stanton,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:
Sir:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a communication
from the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated June 13, 1862, request-
ing me to furnish you with the information necessary to answer
certain resolutions introduced in the House of Representatives
June 9, 1862, on motion of the Honorable Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky.
14. Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 2587.
15. House Exec. Dec. 5., 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Document 133.
War Records, Serial v o. 123, pp. 196-198.
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Only having received the letter covering these inquiries at a
late hour on Saturday night, I urge forward my answer in time for
the steamer sailing today (Monday), this haste preventing me from
entering as minutely as I could wish upon many points of details such
as the paramount importance of the subject calls for.
To the first, question, I reply that no regiment of ''fugitive'
slaves has been or is being organized in this department. There is,
however, a fine regiment of persons whose late masters are 'fugitive
rebels' men who everywhere fly before the approacn of the National
flag, leaving their servants behind them to shift, as best they can
for themselves.
To the second question, I have the honor to answer that the in-
structions given to Brig. Gen. T. Vv . Sherman by the Hon, Simon
Cameron, late Secretary of War, and turned over to me by succession
for my guidance, do distinctly authorize me to employ all loyal per-
sons offering their services in defense of the Union, in any manner
I might see fit. '^'here is no restriction as to the character or
color of the persons to be employed or the nature of the employment,
whether civil or military, in which their services should be used.
I conclude, therefore, that I have been authorized to enlist 'fugi-
tive slaves' as soldiers, could any such be found in this department.
No such characters, however have yet appeared within view of our most
advanced pickets. It is the masters who have in every instance been
the 'fugitives', running away from loyal slaves as well as loyal
soldiers, and whom we have only partially been able to see, cliiefly
their heads over ramparts, or, rifle in hand, dodging behind trees
in the extreme distance.
To the third interrogatory it is my painful duty to reply that
I never have received any specific authority for issues of clothing,
uniforms, arms, equipments, &e
.
, to the troops in question, ''either
Have I had any specific authority for supplying these persons with
shovels, spades, and pickaxes, when employing them as laborers, nor
with boats and oars when using them as lightermen; but these are not
points included in Mr. Wickliffe's resolution. To me it seemed that
liberty to employ men in any particular capacity implied with it
liberty also to supply them with the necessary tools, and acting upon
this faith, I have clothed, equipped, and armed the only loyal regi-
ment yet raised in South Carolina.
I must say, in vindication of my conduct, that had it not been
for the many other diversified and imperative claims on my time and
attention, at least five or six v/ell drilled, brave and thoroughly
acclimated regiments should by this time have been added to the loyal
forces of the Union. The experiment of arming the blacks, so far as
I have made it, has been a complete and even marvelous success. They
are sober, docile, attentive, and enthusiastic,' displaying great
natural capacities for acquiring the duties of the sdldier. They are
eager, beyond all things, to take the field and be led into action;
and it is the unanimous opinion of the officers who have had charge
of them that in the peculiarities of the climate and country they

17
will prove invaluable auxilliaries
,
fully equal to the similar regi-
ments so long andsucces sfully used "by the British authorities in the
Vest India Islands.
In conclusion, I would say it is my hope, there appearing no
possibility of other re-enforcements, owing to the exigencies of the
campaign in the Peninsula, to have orgainzed by the end of next fall
and to be able to present to the Government from 48,000 to50,000 of
these hardy and devoted soldiers.
Trusting that this letter may form part of your answer to Mr.
Wickliffe's resolutions,
I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your very obedient
servant,
D. Hunter,
Maj or-Ceneral, Commanding.
"
One wonders what would have been the result had General Hunter
had as much time as he liked for the composition of his report. He
could scarcely have concocted a paper more certain to infuriate his
opponents and make his partisans chuckle in unholy glee at his impu-
dent daring. The farcial allusions to the "fugitive masters", the
apologetic reference to hih lack of authority to issue spades and
shovels, the suggestion that only lack of time had prevented a more
satisfactory report of half a dozen instead of only one regiment, the
politic reference to the long use of colored troops by the British
were well calculated to make the anti-slavery North smile with amuse-
ment, while Border States men raged. Rather more seriously meant,
and infinitely more apt to win new converts to his cause were his
pleas of need for acclimated troops and re-en i'orcements . There was
no dismissing them as unfounded or as mere impudence.

-18
Unfortunately, Mr. Wickliffe was not present to listen to the
reading of this extraordinary communication. Upon vote of the
House it was ordered printed. One member suggested that ten thou-
sand extra copies be printed for distribution while a still more
enthusiastic supporter expressed his hope that they would make it a
hundred thousand. 1 '' The next day the House refused to sustain a
resolution introduced by Wickliffe' s colleague Dunlap, to the effect
the paper was insulting18 to Congress and Army, and that Hunter
should be censured. On the fifth Mr. Wickliffe brought up the sub-
ject again, and urged a reconsideration of the vote to print General
Hunter's highly irritating letter. He criticized the Secretary of
War for seemingly indorsing its insulting phrases by transmitting it
to the House, and attacked the truthfulness of most of its state-
ments. Letters of protest against the organization of the new regi-
ment and particularly against the method of organization were pro-
duced, showing opposition among white soldiers and the Treasury
Agents. After a hot debate his motion to reconsider the vote to
19print was laid on the table.
But this refusal to censure was purely negative in its effect,
and the First South Carolina Volunteers were desperately in need of
active and substantial support. Appeals for authority to muster in-
to service "all" loyal men and to appoint officers for new regiments
went unheard, though by the eleventh of July, General Hunter was
urging it as a military necessity; that he must have more troops if
16. Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sees., 3102.
17. ibid., 3087.
18. ibid., 3109.
19. ibid., 3121-3127.
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he were to control thelong stretch of coast as it should he con-
trolled, and in spite of the fact that he was very shortly after
compelled to give the order for the abandonment of a part of the
territory because of lack of reenforcements
.
20 Under such conditions
the regiment could not succeed. Formal recruiting was finally
stopped, while General Hunter made a last appeal for authority to
issue commissions to men who were acting as officers, and especially
urged that some provision be made for the payment of his men. Deser-
tions were frequent, due to the unpaid condition of the negroes, but
he was still optimistic as to the possibility of putting many thou-
sands of men in the service, once the financial and legal disability
was removed. Failing to receive the requested authority, General
Hunter on the tenth of August wrote to Secretary of War Cameron that
he had felt obliged to disband them, with the exception of one company
22
and co ended the first attempt at the use of slave soldiers.
Major-General Butler, commanding in the Department of the Gulf,
was in the meantime facing the negro problen from rather a different
angle. In his Department, the people had for the most part remained
quiet, and the city of Mew Orleans had been promised protection for
life and property so long as that quiet was maintained. But the
slaves were coming in large numbers to the Union lines, slaves of
loyal and disloyal masters alike. Those whom he could use, General
Butler put to work, the rest were sent out side the lines. But this
was merely a temporary expedient. General Butler realized well
enough that there must be some settled policy of action toward the
20. War Records, Serial No. 20, pp. 365-364.
21. ibid., Serial No. 123, p. 292.
T. W. Higginson, Army Life in a Flack Regiment, 273.
22. War Records, Serial No. 123, p. 745.
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negroes, that all or none should be allowed within the lines. Un-
fortunately, too, it was not the "best claf-s of negroes who came first
but the vicious and unmanageable sort who were most frequently under
punishment from their masters. It was utterly impossible to take all
Lack of sufficient supplies made that absolutely out of the question,
yet it seemed inhumane to accept the poorer class who made the first
applications to the exclusion of their more honest and thrifty
23
companions.
General Hunter's intent to arm a black regiment was already
known to General Butler, who had little sympathy with the plan, and
who felt that in the Department of the Gulf it would be worse than
useless. For one thing, it was not necessary there, as General
Hunter had claimed it to be in South Carolina, to arm negroes for
the sake of having an acclimated force. At that time, the latter
part of May, 1862, General Butler felt that there were still plenty
of white citizens who could be put into army when the need came, and
who had spent their lives within the state, and he had greater faitlt
in the resisting power of northern troops to diseases peculiar to the
South. Further more, the possibility of developing efficient troops
from negro slaves, seemed to him very small. He agreed with John
Brown in the theory that the negro should be armed with a pike or
spear instead of a. musket if he was to be armed at all. .He was quite
satisfied to continue the Government policy of non-interference, but
was uncertain as to the best method of putting it into practise in
the case of the hordes of slaves who came to the lines.
23. War Records, Serial No. 21, pp. 439-444.
24. ibid.
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The attitude of some of his subordinates was not wholly in har-
mony with this policy. Brigadier General Phelps, who commanded the
forces at Camp Parapet, some six miles above the city of New Orleans,
was in particular inclined toward more radical measures. Ke advo-
cated immediate emancipation and arming as a military measure, and
in spite of orders from headquarters to the effect that all unem-
ployed persons should be excluded from the lines, he persisted in
admitting runaway' slaves, and even in allowing his men to entice
negroes to escape 25 . His insubordination did not stop here. In
July, he began the organization of these negroes into companies, and
by the thirtieth of the month reported more than three hundred men
in organization. General Phelps took the stand that the southern
loyalists were under obligation to furnish their quota of men as well
as of money and supplies, The most practical way of accomplishing
that end, and at the same time the best means of preventing any ten-
dencies toward a general servile insurrection was to arm and train
the contrabands. The fact that the white troops were not standing
out as well as General Butler had expected in the face of swampy
location and malarial air also helped bring him to such a decision.
At Camp Parapet white soldiers were dying at the rate of two or three
The first news General Butler had of this organization was a
requisition for arms and equipment. He met the situation with an
attempt at compromise. He did not answer the requisition, but sent
an order to ueneral Phelps to employ the contrabands in and around
a day. 26
25. ibid
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the camp in cutting down trees. This order was received as an in-
sult. In reply General Phelps said, "I must state that while I am
willing to prepare African regiments for the defense of the Govern-
ment against its assailants. I am not willing to become the mere
slave-driver which you propose, having no qualifications in that way.
I am therefore under the necessity of tendering the resignation of
my commission as an officer of the Army of the United States, and re-
spectfully request a leave of absence until it is accepted." This
was no part of General Butler's plan. He wrote a very temperate an-
swer, pointing out that if the work asked of the negro companies was
not done by them, white soldiers would be obliged to do it as they
had done it earlier. He refused to accept General Phelps resignation
27
while still insisting on the carrying out of this order.
But the same circumstance which had forced General Hunter to the
arming of negro troops forced General Butler to conquer his prejudice
against their use. He was faced by a stringent need of re-enforce-
ments. On the fourteenth of August he wrote to Secretary Stanton,
"We are now threatened by the whole western division of the south-
ern Army, under Generals VanDorn, Rreckenridge , and Jeff. Thompson,
together with whatever troops can be gathered from Texas or on the
western bank of the river.
Tne witndrawal of the troops at Vicksburg and the apparent in-
activity or withdrawal of troops from Corinth has allowed the concen-
tration of all their troops upon us.
Vicksburg is essentially bare of troops. We are considerably
weakened by disease and discharges of those whom nine months' service
have shown unfit for duty
I need re-enforcements very much; without them I cannot cooper-
ate with the i avy against Mobile. Indeed we are threatened with an
attack on the city of New Orleans. I am not specially disturbed at
that. If it becomes at all imminent I shall call on Africa to inter-
vene, and I do not think I shall call in vain."
27. War Records, Serial No. 21, pp. 534-537.
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But General Butler was more conservative than General Phelps in
his manner of calling negro troops to service. There was in the city
of New Orleans a hriga.de of free colored men, organized in the latter
part of April, 1861, and enrolled as part of the militia of the
state. In March, 1862, the 'organization was ordered by Governor
Moore to continue during the war, and to hold itself subject to the
orders of the r.aj or-General commanding state militia. They remained
in the city after its capture, and their officers called upon General
Butler to discover what provisions could be made for their continu-
29
ance as an organization.
It was to these men, and all other free negroes that General
Butler made his appeal for recruits, August twenty second, 1362. The
members of the colored brigade were of a superior type, intelligent,
energetic and industrious. General Butler humorously remarked of
them that the darkest would be "about the complexion of the late Mr.
Webster." 30 It was a clever move, this taking over of the Colored
Brigade. The question of slavery was avoided, the Confederates
should have been silenced by the fact that these men had been organ-
ized first by Southerners, and they were of such a class of men as
to lessen the opposition from white troops. In deference to the rath-
er uncertain policy of the Federal Government, General Butler in-
serted the clause in his call for recruits that they should be "ac-
cepted, paid, equipped, armed and rationed as are other volunteer
29. ibid., Serial No. 123, pp. 436-436.
p. 442.
30. ibid., Serial No. 21, p. 559.
30. ibid., Dennison-Chase Correspondence, Am. Kist. Asscr; . Rept .
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troops of the United States, subject to the approval of the President
of the United States."' One is obliged to believe that the insistence
on the freedom of all recruits was rather more a matter of form than
a practical demand. All those who had received freedom through some
legal Ghaimel were received, and that included most of the negroes
most likely to desire enlistment, that is; those already freed "by
their masters, those freed by any military court, and all who came
from the enemy lines.
There seems to have been none of the difficulty in securing re-
cruits which had operated against the success of General Hunter's
plan. On the twenty seventh of September, 1862, the first regiment
"51
was mustered into the United States service, 1 '' although not formally
recognized by the War department, and a second regiment was begun.
The men were put on railroad guard duty and were continued in service
until the beginning of the next year when at last formal recognition
of negro troops came from Washington. It is true that there was here
as in South Carolina a certain amount of opposition from the white
go
troops.
1
" out General Butler was heart and soul behind the pro.iect
and proceeded with the organization as long as he had arms for them.
General Butler received no communications of disapproval either from
the War Department or from the Commander-in-chief, at that time
Major-General K. W. Ealleck. 33
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The third attempt at arming negroes, that of General Lane, is
chiefly interesting as a Northern movement, unaccompanied "by the plea
of military necessity, and comparatively free from the perplexities
of the contraband problem. In the latter part of July, 1862, General
Lane was notified of his appointment as commissioner of recruiting
in the Department of Kansas.'' It was soon rumored that no loyal
citizen of the state would be rejected on account of color, and that
inquiries as to free papers might not be unduly exacting. That the
rumor was at least partially correct was promptly disclosed. August
fifth, in a dispatch to Secretary Stanton, General Lane said:
"Recruiting opens up beautifully. Good for four regiments of
whites and two of blacks . August sixth a general order was issued
explaining the terms upon which negroes would he received, but Gen-
eral Lane was evidently not wholly satisfied as to his authority for
such a move, and he telegraphed to Washington for definite assur-
ance. 36 In the interval before a reply, advertisements were inserted
57
in the Kansas papers calling for negro volunteers.""' The response
was eager. !.egroes flocked into Lawrence, and within a week some
hundred were enrolled there, and drill begun. Two companies were
38
organized and commissions were applied for from Governor Robinson.
But General Lane's appeal to Washington was no more successful than
those of Generals Hunter and Sutler, and in a letter of August
twenty third, Secretary Stanton, while congratulating him upon the
general success of his recruiting, informed him that negro regiments
34. War Records, Serial Ho. 123, p. 959.
35. ibid., p. 294.
36. ibid., Special Correspondent, pp. 311, 312-373.
37. New York Times ,* August 18, 1862.
38. War Records, Serial No. 123, p. 417.
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could not be accepted into the United States service. 39 The men were
not however dismissed, but kept in camp, perfecting themselves in
drill. The order was effective in checking enlistment, and the regi-
ment remained in its incomplete and unrecognized state until the gen-
eral orgainzatior, of colored troops was begun the next year.
39. ibid., p. 44b.
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II
CHANGING OPINION AND THE AUTHORIZATION OF NEGRO TROOPS
It was not possible that three high officials of the United
States Army could attempt an innovation so foreign to the general
practise of the Nation, and so radical in its treatment of the prob-
lem which lay at the root of the entire civil struggle, without
bringing the matter sharply to an issue throughout the country. Dur
ing all the summer and autumn of 1862, the subject was the theme of
much controversy, before the people North and South, in Congress, and
between the President and his Cabinet.
Opinion as to the advisability of arming negroes and especially
the slaves, was divided along much the same lines which separated
those who desired and those who feared emancipation. Argument raged
for and against. Where one man said that the certain result of their
arming would be servile insurrection and a reign of barbarity, an-
other said that the only sure means of preventing insurrection and a
general slaughter of slave owning whites was by putting the negroes
into arms, and subjecting them to military control. So the warning
that fifty thousand white troops from the Border States would throw
down their arms or even .join the Confederate forces rather than fight
side by side with colored troops, oarae the answer that two hundred
and fifty thousand loyal men would be gained and that the South
would lose the force which planted the crops and harvested them,
while the white men went enmasse to join the colors. If some one
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argued that the twenty millions of the Forth would show themselves
pitiably weak by calling in negroes to help them conquer the eleven
millions of the Souta, it was replied that only criminal disregard
of the cost of the war could prevent the use of every means calcu-
lated to shorten it. Not all arguments were so easily met. A large
proportion of those who hoped to see the negro freed, were dubious
as to his qualifications for a soldier. Nothing but actual experi-
ence could quash the general theory that the race had no military
qualities, and obviously there was little opportunity for that ex-
perience .
But as the war dragged on far past the three months period so
optimistically prophesied as its limit in the earlier days, the ques-
tion began to receive more serious consideration, and in the Forth
at least the body of Public Opinion in its favor grew. There were
two reasons for this. First,, the reports from the commanders who
were trying out the matter were highly enthusiastic. The negroes
belied the uncomplimentary predictions of their stupidity, laziness,
and untrustworthiness , and General Hunter with his slave regiment in
South Carolina, and General Butler with his highly educated brigade
of free men, and General Lane with his combination of contrabands
and northern free negroes, were unanimous as to the ability of these
men to quickly and accurately master new duties. So the negro him-
self was looked upon with more respect.
In the second place, the wa* was beginning to come more closely
home to the North. The solicitude for the protection of the proper-
1. far Records, Serial No. 123, p. 198.
Am. Hist. Assoc. Rep't., 1902, II,
New York Times, June 6, 1862. General Lane's Address before
the Emancipation League.
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ty rights of Southern families, the fear lest some South Carolina or
Louisiana planter might be ill treated by armed men who had been his
slaves, was pushed into the background when the report came back that
Northern troops were dying from the fevers of the coast and swamps.
People began to speak of "acclimated troops", and the possibility of
using negroes seemed less remote. So too, the failure of the Rich-
mond compaign, the call for three hundred thousand fresh troops, the
slow responce to the call and prospect of a draft changed more than
one person's ideas aB to the propriety of establishing this new arm
of the service. 2 Instead of talking of the indignity of subjecting
whitesoldiers to a humiliating contact with black ones, people began
to say that since the war was all on account of the negro, he should
pay his share of the price. More and more too, the economic import-
ance of the negro to the military successes of the South was seen in
its real significance. Once the desirability of taking this advant-
age from the South was recognized, the question arose as to what the
North could do with the men. The most promising answer was the plan
so strongly advocated by General Hunter.
All these arguments, pro and con, were showered upon Congress
aad the Executive. President Lincoln's attitude was wholly consist-
ent with the stand he had taken toward slavery. In his inaugural ad-
dress he had pledged himself to non-interference with the institu*
tion. s In March, 1862, in an interview with certain representatives
from the Border States, he denied that in his recent plea for cora-
2. Belleville Advocate. July 25, 1862.
War Records, Serial No. 123, p. 45.
3. Lincoln, Works, Federal Edit ion , V, 253-266.

. so
pensated emancipation there was any intent to hurt those States, that
on the contrary it was an offer of escape from the chaotic condition
caused by the pressure of armed Union forces in slaves states, and
the consequent flight of slaves to the lines. 4 General Frimont's
order of Emancipation, and General Hunter's later one were promptly
revoked. 5 So long as he pursued this policy of conciliation. Presi-
dent Lincoln could not sanction the arming of slaves. Although
Secretaries Stanton, Seward, and Chase were all in favor of granting
General Hunter the authority he asked for enlistment of colored as
well as white troops, President Lincoln still considered it a meas-
ure certain to provoke more evil than good and refused to give it his
support
.
6
The spirit in Congress was less conservative. The two measures
to which reference has already "been made, the Confiscation Bill of
1861, and the Bill of March 13, 1862, freeing slaves held in service
against the Federal Government, were indicative of the gradually
strengthening anti slavery feeling. On the tenth of April, the joint
resolution in favor of compensated emancipation, recommended to Con-
gress "by the President in his special message of March sixth, and
passed by both Houses, was sent back to him for his final approval.
Two days later, he signed a bill emancipating the slaves in the "Dis-
trict of Columbia. The next anti slavery measure was the bill pro-
hibiting slavery in the territories. The bill was introduced in the
House in the latter part of March, 1862, and after much debate was
4. ibid., 447.
5. War Records, Serial No. 3, pp. 477, 485.
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finally passed in an amended form on the seventeenth of June. It
was a big triumph for the anti-slavery forces who were so used to
seeing the slave holding interests victorious in the struggle over
7
slavery in the territories.
Two more measures were to be passed before the end of the sum-
mer by which Congress definitely recorded its approval of the arming
of negroes. Mr. Trumbull of Illinois introduced a bill in the Senate,
in the first week of December, 1S62, providing for the freeing of
slaves of any persons who should take up arms against the Government,
or y/ho should in any way abet the Rebellion. It was the next logic-
al step in the anti -slavery program. In presenting his bill, Mr.
Trumbull made the usual .iustificat ion for the measure, that odd com-
bination of theories of the North and South, that since the South
considered the negro as property, the North was justified in using
that plea to make him a free man. It was urged also as one of the
Q
most rapid means of attaining a successful conclusion to the war.
The bill was violently opposed and as earnestly upheld. It was
argued that its passage would consolidate the South more effectively
than any circumstances had been able to do up to that time, that it
was equivalent to a dissolution of the Union and would leave the
blame upon the North. On the other hand, it was supported as just
and right that the Government should so protect itself. As a practi-
cal argument against the bill, it was pointed out that it would be
almost impossible to free the immense number of slaves, simply be-
cause there was no place open to them once freed. The North did not
7. Wilson, Anti Slavery Measures in Congress, Chapters I-V.
8. Cong. Globe, 2 Sess., 37 Cong., 18-19.
A.
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want them, and reenslavement or extermination was inevitable. 'vhe
debate continued day after day. Various substitutes were proposed,
all of which were finally referred to a select committee, "with in-
structions to "bring in a bill for the confiscation of all the proper-
ty of the leading insurgents, and the emancipation of the slaves of
all persons who have taken up arms against the United States during
the present insurrection." 1 - The bill reported differed in many re-
spects from the original, and there was an additional clause which
provided fresh material for debate. This bill provided that at any
time after the passage of the bill, the President might issue a pro-
clamation, proclaiming the freedom of slaves of persons found in
arms against the Government thirty days after the issuing of the pa-
per. Ho slave escaping from his master was to be given up unless his
master could prove his loyalty, and finally, the President was author
ized to employ persons of African descent for the suppression of the
Rebellion. The debate began again with renewed vigor. *
The House of Representatives was in the meantime struggling
with the same problem. December second, 1861, Mr. Eliot of Massachu-
setts, introduced a joint resolution recommending that the President
exercise his right as commander-in-chief of the Army to emancipate
persons held as slaves in any military district in a state of in-
12
surrection against the National Government. After a debate cover-
ing several days, it was referred to the Judiciary Commi ttee , ^and
on the twelfth of Llarch reported back with the recommendation that
it should not pass. It was referred a month later to a select com-
9. -Cong. Globe, 2Sess., 37., Cong., 942-945, 1049-1054.
10. ibid., 1965.
11. ibid., 2165-2173.
12. Gong., Globe, 2 Sess., 37 Gong., 5-7.
13. ibid., 78-37, 115-117.
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mittee
.
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April thirtieth, Mr. Eliot introduced two new "bills, a confis-
15
cation till, and another emancipating slaves of rebels. May
16
twentieth, they were brought up for discussion. ° r 'he speeches on
both sides were delivered with all the earnestness which intense
feeling could produce. Mr. Sedgwick of Mew York introduced an amend-
1
7
ment denouncing the eleven states which, combined under the title of
the Confederate States of America, had "made war upon" the Government
of the United States, and continued in auch war and rebellion. Upon
this he proposed to base an enactment making it the duty of the com-
manding officer of every military or naval department within those
states, to invite all loyal persons, including slaves, to come with-
in the lines and be enrolled in the United States service. He stated
specifically that he meant this to include any branch of the service
for which they were capable, civil or military. He proposed to offer
freedom as a reward for such services.
The debate raged on and on. /.ntislavery men pleaded the rights
of humanity, liberty and the inviolability of the Union, Southern
sympathizers condemmed measures so hostile to the Constitution, and
labelled them wicked implements of destruction to the spirit which
still held North and Border States together. General Hunter and his
18black regiment came in for their share of the discussion . Mr.
ifickliffe of , entucky denounced Hunter in the bitterest language, and
14. ibid., 1302, 1820.
15. ibid., 1886.
16. ibid., 2232-2246, 2265-227 <±.
2292-2305
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his speech did not lack support. "Pass these acts, confiscate under
these hills the property of these men, em. ncipate their negroes,
place arms in the hands of tnese human gorillas to murder their mas-
ters and violate their wives and daughters, and you will have a war
such as was never witnessed in the worst days of the French Revolu-
tion, and horrors never exceeded in St. Domingo, for the "balance of
19
the century at least," said one of the opponents of the measures.
But the confiscation bill passed upon the final question, and
then came the question of the Emancipation bill. Mr. Sedgwick's some
what highly colored amendment was defeated by a large majority, and
20
the bill itself failed on a vote of seventy four to seventy eight.
On the fourth of June a motion to reconsider the vote was agreed to,
and the bill re-committed to a Special Committee . A substitute bill
was reported back, and on the eighteenth of June passed the House in
a form which provided for the freeing of slaves of all persons in
rebellion sixty days after the President should issue his procla-
mation . ^
The confiscation bill came before the Senate a few days later.
Here it was amended by the substitution of the Senate bill, and sent
back to the House. The amendment was not concurred in, and a confer-
ence committee was appointed. The bill reported by the committee
combined emancipation and confiscation. 22 It was in substance the
Senate bill, and provided that all slaves of persons who should give
aid or comfort to the Rebellion, who should take refuge within the
19. ibid., 271.
20. Cong. Globe., 2 Seas., 37 Cong., 2361.
21. Cong. Globe, 2Sess., 37 Cong., 2793.
22. ibid. -267,
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lines of the Army, all slaves captured by such persons, or deserted
by them and coming under the control of the Government, should be
considered captives of war and be forever free. Fugitive slaves
were not to he surrendered to rebels, and the President was author-
ized to employ persons of African descent for the suppression of the
Rebellion, and to organize arid use them in such manner as he might
judge best for the public welfare. The report was accepted, in the
House by a vote of eighty two to forty two, and in the Senate by a
vote of twenty seven to twelve. ° Cn the seventeenth of July, the
bill received the approval of the President of the United States.
The second bill was more direct in its form. Mr. Wilson, sena-
tor from Massachusetts, reported a bill on the eighth of July, 1862,
to amend the militia act of 1795. The next day the bill was dis-
cussed in the Qommittee of the Whole. Mr. Grimes of Iowa offered an
amendment providing that there should be no exemption from military
duty on account of color, and that the President have full power and
authority to organize them according to race or color. Of course
such a proposition met instant opposition. It was characterized as
an attempt "to elevate the miserable nigger," to which a second Demo
crat added that its effect would be not the elevation of the negro,
but the degrading of the white man to his level. To this it was re-
plied that if the United States was not prepared to recognize the
Southern Confederacy, it must accept every means within its power for
the prosecution of the war. The probable attitude of the white troop
troops was much argued. Mr. Wilson seized the opportunity to defend
both the negro and the democratic spirit of the white soldier. He
23. ibid., 3267, 3276.
24. Cong. Globe, 2 Sess. 37 Cong., 3197-7196.
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cited the use of negroes in the Revolution and in the War of 1812.
But such an argument was of little effect with Border States
men. Said one, "You propose to place arms in the hands of the men
and "boys, or such of them as are able to hear arms, and to manumit,
the whole mass, men, women, and children, and leave them among us.
Do you expect us to give our sanction and our approval to these
things? No! No! We would recognize their authors as our worst ene-
mies, and there is no foreign despotism that could come to our rescue,
that we would not joyously embrace, "before we would submit to any
such condition of things as that. Put, before we had invoked this
foreign despotism, we would arm every man and boy that we have in the
land, and we would meet you in a death struggle, to overthrow to-
gether such an oppression and our oppressors."^
Mr. Collaraer in a continuation of the debate July tenth, sup-
ported the measure- on the plea of expediency. Ke said, "I never
could understand, and do not now understand, why the Government of
the United States has not the right to the use of every man in it,
black or white, for its defence; and every horse, every particle of
property, every dollar in money, of every man in it. As to the using
of colored men, that is entirely a question of expediency, whether
you need them, whether you can use them to advantage; and that de-
pends on so many contingencies, that I have always supposed the Presi«
dent, the generals, the men who are managing the war, actually engin-
eering it along, if you please, would lay their hands upon and us{=
all means and appliances to that end which they found necessary."
A motion to strike out the words "any military or naval" before
"service" was lost, and the section in question passed with an amend-
ment providing for compensatxon of all loyal persons who should under
27
the act lose the services of any persons.
The second section of the Grimes amendment, granting freedom to
the mothers, wives and children of any "man or boy of African descenf
who should "render any such service as is provided for in the first
section of this act, "come next under discussion. After some debate
the section was limited by an amendment to include only those fami-
25. Cong. Globe, 2Sess<*, 37 Cong., 3198-3207.
26. ibid., 3228.
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lies "belonging to disloyal persons. But opposition was still strong
and further discussion was postponed.*-0
A new "bill to amend the militia act of 1795 was brought in from
the Committee on Military Affairs and the Militia, on the twelfth of
July. 29 This bill was more explicit in its provision than the form-
er one, authorizing the President "to receive into the service of the
United States, for the purpose of constructing entrenchments, or per-
forming camp service, or any other lahor, or any military or naval
service for which they may be found competent, persons of African
descent, and such persons shall be enrolled and organized under such
regulations, not inconsistent with fne Constitution and laws, as the
President may prescribe." Another section repeated the proposition
of the Grimes bill to free the families of slaves who rendered such
service to the Union. Provision for payment was made, a provision
which allowed to the colored men, ten dollars per month and one ra-
tion, three dollars of whieh monthly was to be in clothing, as
against the thirteen dollars a month and one ration, with an allow-
ance of three dollars and a half for clothing, which white troops re-
ceived. 30
By a vote of eighteen to seventeen, an amendment was added
limiting the emancipation of such slaves to those "belonging to dis-
loyal masters. 31 The point was bitterly contested, the one side de-
nouncing it as a sharaful and humiliating policy which could permit a
man to fight for the Union, and then send him back to slavery, while
the supporters of the amendment urged the rights of slaveholding
28. ibid., 7237.
29. Cong. Globe, 2 Bess., 37 Cong., 3289.
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loyalists, Even the addition of the amendment did not quite the fears
of all the members as to the effect of the bill. It was stigmatized
as "the most disastrous measure for the integrity of this union that
has been or can be before Congress", but the final vote twenty eight
to nine in its favor indicated clearly the general feeling of the
Senate
.
22
The bill went immediately before the House, Y/here it was passed
on the sixteenth of July without amendment, and on July seventeenth
it too received the President's signature and so became law.
Put the effectiveness of these two bills depended upon the will-
ingness of the President to issue the proclamations recommended, and
he could not yet bring himself to that step. Cn the twenty second of
the month, April, a Presidential order was issued authorizing command
ers in rebelling states to confiscate "any property, real or person-
al," "necessary or convenient" for supplies to other military pur-
poses and providing that naval and military commanders should use
"as laborers" as many persons of African descent as might prove ad-
vantageous. 33 But this did not permit arming for use as soldiers.
President Lincoln expressed his fears for the efficacy of such a
measure in his reply to a committee from Chicago religious organiza-
3^-
tion, v/ho asked a proclamation of emancipation. * He said, "un-
questionably, it would weaken the rebels by drawing off their labor-
ers, which is of great importance, but I am not so sure we could do
much with the blacks. If we were to arm them, I fear that in a few
weeks the arms would be in the hands of the rebels; and, indeed, thus
far we have not had arms enough to equip our white troops. I will
mention another thing, though it meet only your scorn and contempt.
There are fifth thousand bayonets in the Union armies from the border
slave States, It would be a serious matter, if in consequence of a
32. ibid., 3348, 3351.
33. War Records, Serial Ho. 126, p. 6b6.
34. Lincoln, V/orks, Federal Edition, VI, 139.
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proclamation such as you desire, they should go over to the rebels.
Ido not think they all would--not so many, indeed as a year ago or
as six months ago--not so many today as yesterday. Every day in-
creases their Union feeling. They are also getting their pride en-
listed, and want to "beat the rebels."
There was protest of course, and denunciation of this inaggress-
ive policy of the President, but the effect upon the Border States
was undoubtedly quieting. Even those who most earnestly advocated
the arming of the negroes were obliged to admit that the President s
compromise was effective in the purpose of drawing the slaves away
from their rebel masters, which was quite as important as making
them a part of the Federal forces, and though there was grumbling,
it v/as often followed ty a grudging admission that the President was
perhaps right after all.
There was already some evidence to the effect that the policy
might eventually change. Although the President refused to receive
two colored regiments offered as late as August sixth by a Western
delegation, '^witnin the month orders went South from the War Depart-
ment to General Rufus Saxton, who had been given charge of the con-
36
traband problem in the Department of the South, that he might or-
ganize and arm five thousand colored men. General Saxton had asked
authority to enroll a force of about five thousand contrabands as
laborers in the Quarter Master's Department. The negroes along the
coast occupied by Union forces were fearful of attack from their re-
bel master. Such guarantee of protection as would be given by their
enrollment as laborers in the United States service, would be most
effective in hastening the withdrawal of great numbers of slaves fron
their masters. Another advantage of such an arrangement was the cor-
rection of the injustice which had been done those contrabands who
35. New York Times, Aug. 6, 1862, Washington Correspondence.
36. War Records, Serial No. 125, p. 27.
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had for several months served the Government with no pay "beyond
ration, The condition of the negroes would he improved, friction "be-
tween them and the white troops lessened, and an emergency force pro-
vided. 37 The authority asked for was promptly granted, and General
Saxton was instructed to muster the force into the United States
Service. In addition, because of the small force under his command,
and the inability of the Government to increase it, he was authorized
to "arm, uniform, equip and receive into the service of the United
States, such number of Volunteers of African descent as "he might
'deem expedient not exceeding 5000." The order included provision for
the appointment of officers, and the statement that the troops were
"to be entitled to and receive the same pay and rations as "were
"allowed by law to Volunteers in the service."
With this encouragement the enlistment of negroes began at once
in South Carolina. The one remaining company of General Hunter's
unfortunate black regiment was a part of this first regiment of Souith
Carolina Volunteers, and its commander, C. T. Trowbridge was made
senior captain in the new regiment. This first company was mustered
59
in November fifteenth, 1862. There were still difficulties in the
way of rapid organization. The rebels moved their slaves inland, as
far as possible out of temptation's way, and until inland posts
could be established, recruiting was not rapid. The Quarter Master's
Department took many of the negroes who did escape, and General Sax-
ton made no attempt to divert any men from that department to his
regiment. Finally, the unpaid and unsupported condition of General
Hunter's regiment was still vividly in the minds of many colored men.
37. War Records, Serial : o. 20, p. 374.
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The members of the regiment had suffered, and had seen their children
suffer, while the negroes in the Quarter Master 1 s Department re-
ceived regular pay. This made them slow to venture again. Confi-
r
'"he regiment was not completed until
General Saxton was well satisfied with
the beginning made, and had every confidence in its success. The
opposition in the department was less than had been expected, and
General Saxton had numerous applications for positions as officers
in the new regiment. 4 ^"
After so much of a concession from Government headquarters, it
was no surprise that the President should include in his emancipation
proclamation of January first, 1863, the following paragraph.
"And I further declare and make known that such persons" (slaves
emancipated under the proclamation) "of suitable condition, will be
received into the armed service of the United States to garrison fort
forts, stations^ and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in
said service."
From that day on the problem was not whether or not negroes should be
armed, but how they might be organized for most effective service.
What the South thought of such a policy can easily enough be im-
agined, It was received with bitter scorn and bitter hatred, It was
"monstrous barbarity"; it was "diabolical malignity." To quote the
Richmond Dispatch of July eighteenth, 1862, in its criticism of the
use of negroes even on northern fortifications; "This is the sort of
freedom the deluded slaves enjoy where they get into the clutches of
the abolitionists. They are worked to death, in order to save the
lives of a proportionate number of miserable Yankees, not one half of
whom can lay as much claim to respectability as the blackest corn-
field negro in Virginia. We hope our authorities, in negotiating for
an exchange of prisoners, will make the invaders account for at least
a portion of the 'contrabands' they have stolen, though in making up
their relative value it should appear that the negro was equal to two
Yankees. " 43
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dence was not yet restored,
the following January, 40but
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They were not to be disappointed in the attitude the "authori-
ties" should take. That was expressed with precision and force in
General Orders Number 60, issued from the War Department August
twenty first, 1862. 44
"1. Whereas Maj or-General Hunter, recently in command of the
enemies forces on the coast of South Carolina, and Brigadier-General
Phelps, a military commander of the enemy in the State of Louisiana,
have organized and armed negro slaves for military service against
their masters, citizens of the Confederacy; and whereas the Govern-
ment of the United States has refused to answer an inquiry whether
said conduct of its officers meets its sanction, a.nd has then left
this Government no other means of repressing such crimes and outrages
than the adoption of such measures of retaliation as shall serve to
prevent their repetition:
Ordered, That Maj or-General Hunter and "rigadier-General Phelps
"be no longer held and treated as public enemies of the Confederate
States, hut as out-laws; and that in the event of trie capture of
either of them, or that of any other commissioned officer employed in
drilling, organizing, or instruction slaves, with a view to their
armed service in this war, he shall not "be regarded as a prisoner of
war, but held in close confinement for execution as a felon at such
time and place as the President shall order."
44. Jar Records, Serial To. 20, p. 599,
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III
ORGANIZATION
A fter the issuance of the emancipati or: proclamation, the re-
cruiting of colored troops began in earnest. The plan once promul-
gated as a Government measure, President Lincoln proposed to get the
greatest possible advantage from it. Rot only was the recruiting of
negro troops sanctioned, but early in January President Lincoln wan
suggesting to one of his Generals that tne latter might find it
practicable to garrison certain forts under his command with colored
troops, so that the white forces might be used elsewhere. 1
Naturally enough, Governor Andrev/s of Massachusetts was one of
the first to begin the recruiting of blacks, as he had been one of
the first to urge such a measure upon the Government. He had stood
firmly behind General Hunter in his struggle for the recognition of
colored troops, ^and now that the Government had taken a favorable
stand, he began the work without delay. Two regiments were organ-
ized, the Fifty-fourth and Fifty- fifth Massachusetts . These were
the only colored regiments to be raised and officered as state troops
(
and to serve a.s such.*" governor Andrew spared no pains to make these
first northern negro regiments proof against the criticism they were
certain to be subjected to. He was justly proud of them and had no
intention that they should be assigned to inglorious fatigue duty
1. Lincoln, Works, Nicolay and Hay, II, 298.
2. War Records, Serial No. 123, p. 45.
3. ibid., Serial No. 126, p. 661.
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for the duration of the war. Though he had proposed that they be
sent to North Carolina as a nucleus for the formation of a black
griga.de under General Foster, he stipulated that unless "active
operations of a brilliant sort" were contemplated in that State, they
be sent to South Carolina, where "under General Hunter negro troops
will be appreciated and allowed a place in onward and honorable
movements of active war." 4 As General Foster could make no promise
of "brilliant" service, and General Hunter was anxious to have the
Massachuse tts regiments in his Department, they were assigned to his
command. 5 May twenty-eighth, under the command of Colonel Robert
Gould Shaw, the Fifty- fourth embarked, the first colored regiment to
be sent South. Great was the excitement in Boston as they marched
down State Street, cheers and groans, reproaches and applause follow-
ing them in one confused roar,^
On arrival at Port Royal they found t :,o colored regiments under
process of recruiting, one under the command of Colonel T . Vv1 . Higgin-
son, the other under Colonel Montgomery of Kansas. To the latter'
s
7brigade the Massachusetts regiment was assigned, "hey remained in
the "Department for the few short weeks before their famous assault
upon Fort Wagner. General Hunter was completely satisfied with the
results of the organization of colored troops in his Department.
Three regiments had been recruited under General Saxton's supervision
and two more were planned for, to be enrolled from the surplus labor-
ers of the Quarter Master's, Commissary, Ordnance and Medical De-
4. "War Records, Serial No. 124, p. 109.
5. ibid., pp. 190, 19 2, 210.
6. G. W. James, Assault on Ft. Wagner, Glimpses of a Nation's
Struggle, First Series, 13-14.
7. ibid.,
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parturients. The men showed m themselves the making of good soldiers
and the opposition among the white troops was gradually dying out.
Recruiting within the Department never exceeded the limits of the
first autnorization for five thousand men however. The demand for
laborers was so great that comparatively few able bodied men remained
for enlistment. A later attempt at a wholesale impressment within
q
the district proved most unsatisfactory.*
In North Carolina, the recruiting of one regiment was begun un-
der Brigadier-General Wild. General Foster, commanding in the Depart-
ment, while quite willing to carry out the wishes of the Government,
v/as dubious as to the possibility of enlisting a larger number of
Volunteers. The negroes had no enthusiasm for military service, and
although anxious to work for the Government, much preferred some
sort of labor which would permit them to remain with their families^
Under the direction of Brigadier-General Thomas, recruiting was
begun in the Mississippi Valley. He was ordered by Secretary Stanton
to make an extensive inspection trip along the river, studying the
situation of the contrabands, their treatment by military authorities,
food and clothing supplies and general welfare. He was to confer
with General Grant and other commanders on the subject of negro
troops, urging the importance of their immediate incorporation into
the military forces of the United States. 1 ' 1 In accordance with these
instruction, General Thomas proceeded down the river, stopping at
such large posts as Cairo and Memphis. At the latter place he author-
ized the recruiting of six companies of colored troops by General
8. War Records, Serial No. 124, p. 177.
9. ibid., pp. 1027,621.
10. War Records, Serial No. 124, pp. 122, 192.
11. ibid., p. 100.
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Hurlbut , who assured him that the white troops, especially those who
12had "been under fire, would support the movement. At Helena, Arkan-
sas, his project received the heartiest support "both from the command-
ers there and the seven thousand white troops whom he addressed.
The prospect of a. vigorous and aggressive policy gave the men a. new
1
3
confidence in the success of their cause.
These enthusiastic reports continued from Lake Providence,
Louisiana, he wrote of having addressed two divisions of McPherson 1 s
army corps on the subject. The men listened to the proposition with
approval, and his request for officers for two "black regiments was
met with applications enough to furnish twice the number. There were
indications that ten regiments could be obtained without difficulty^- 4
The interview with General Grant proved satisfactory also. The lat-
ter with his commanding officers was willing to push the policy of
arming the blacks, and took immediate steps to secure the aid of all
corps, division, and post commanders. The west banit of the river
was under Federal control, and it was thought that by sending forag-
ing parties across the river to collect the negroes some twenty thou-
sand could be recruited.^ 5
May first saw the mustering in of the first regiment recruited
as a result of General Thaoms' expedition. It bore the somewhat
16
lengthy title of the "First Arkansas Volunteers of African Descent."
By May eighteen, recruiting was under way in Louisiana., Mississippi,
and Tennessee, and prior to June thirtieth, five more regiments were
12. ibid., p. 126.
13. ibid., p. liv.
14. War Records, Serial lo. 124, p. 121.
15. ibid., pp. 121, 147.
16. ibid., Serial No. 126, p. 661.

mustered into the United States service. These military organiza-
tions of colored men were mustered directly into the United States
service, and their organization was carried on by officers acting
under Federal authority, and not from any particular state. Trie
officers of trie regiments organized by Adjutant General Thomas in the
Mississippi Valley received their appointments from him, in the
name of the Secretary of War, and Department Commanders were author-
ized to make appointments subject to the approval of the President
for those formed under their direction.
In the Department of the Gulf, General Butler had been succeeded
by I.Iaj or-General Banks. He found three negro regiments in existence,
but due to inefficient officers and the opposition of white troops,
they were in a state of demoralization which forbade their active ser-
vice. In spite of criticism of his " timorous and hesitating" poli-
cy, he proceeded to the reorgai ization of these regiments before en-
listing more negro troops. -hey had been officered by colored men.
whom white soldiers could not bring themselves to salute. These
colored officers were replaced by white men, as the only means of
counteracting the hostility of r.orthern troops. Two regiments of
infantry and one of engineers were begun, but there was not at the
time material within Government control for the form3.tion of further
regiments. ®
Early in January, Brigadier-General Daniel Ullmann was author-
ized by Secretary Stanton to raise four regiments of Louisiana Volun-
teer Infantry witain that state. general Banks was notified of the
17. ibid.,
18. ,.ar Hecords, Serial lo. 41, p. 689.
Dennison Chase Correspondence, Am. Kist. Assoc. Rept., 1902,
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commission by Secretary Stanton and General-in-Chief Ha.lleck, and
Of)
instructed to give nim every aid in the project. v President .Lincoln
also wrote to General Banks, urging that he not only aid U 11maim as
much as possible but carry the project beyond the limits of the lat-
21
ters instructions if possible. This was near the end of Farch.
With the opening of new territory to the Federal forces in April, the
recruiting of negroes was begun with renewed vigor. All new recruits
were appropriated to General Ullmann s Brigade.
In the first week of May, General Ban^s expressed his intention
to organize a corps of colored troops to be called ''The Corps d'Af-
riqueV According to the plan, the corps was to consist of eighteen
regiments, representing all arms of the service, infantry, artillery
and cavalry, with an engineer corps and hospital unit for each divi-
sion. The undertaking was less ambitious than the numbers might in-
dicate, for regiments were limited to five hundred men each. *
Two causes made this necessary. In order that instruction and
discipline might be effected as quickly as possible, the regiments
were decreased in size, so strengthening the control of the officers
and insuring thorough drill. The second cause was due to the pecul-
iar fashion in which recruits were obtained. There was no regularity
about their coming, as new land was opened to northern troops, they
came straggling in, by twos and threes, or sometimes in tens and
dozens. The skeleton organization of five hundred well trained men
permitted additions whenever recruits offered, and shortened the
20. ibid., pp. 101-102.
21. Lincoln, works, liicolay and Hay, II, 318-319.
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time of their training perceptibly. Failure to realize this necess-
ity of getting possession of a negro district before colored troops
coula be organized, furnished material for much of the criticism of
24
the slowness of their organization. It was not in accordance with
military regulations to thus begin a new regiment before an old one
was complete, but upon the explanation of his reasons for so doing,
General Bank's action was approved. ^
As was to be the case only too frequently, there was a tendency
among some of General Bank's subordinates to try impressment as a
means of hastening recruiting. It had the opposite effect of course.
The negroes themselves objected, and made less efficient soldiers.
The inhabitants of the districts from which they were taken objected,
and in Louisiana that was a more serious matter than it had been in
South Carolina where most of the population was bitterly hostile.
There were in the Gulf State large districts occupied by small farm-
ers who owned only a few slaves each. They were for the most part
well disposed toward the Government, and in the habit of furnishing
information fully. Impressment of their negroes meant a reversal of
this policy. Finally, the Treasury agents, establishing plantations
here as in South Carolina, nade the same objection. Impressment of
their laborers meant, serious loss to the Government, with very dis-
proportionate military gain.^6
General Banks met the numerous complaints by issuing certain
strict instructions concerning the black population of the Department.
A commission was appointed to regulate the enrollment, recruitment,
24. ibid., Serial No. 41, p. 6o9.
25. ibid., Serial No. 125, pp. 158, 205, 231.
26. War Records, Serial Wo. 41, pp. 497, 649-650, 736-777.
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employment, and education of negroes. No enlistments were to Toe made
except under the authority of this commission. All able "bodied col-
ored men were to "be enrolled by the provost-marshal general, and en-
listed as they were necessary for public defense. All unemployed
negroes were subject to arrest and iorced labor upon the public 'works
For the peace of mind of the habitants a section was included which
prohibited the use of colored troops for arrests or seizure of prop-
erty, and limited their use as guards except when accompanied by duly
authorized white officers. 2 '''
By the middle of August, General Banks could report the organi-
zation of some ten or twelve thousand men. General Ullmann had five
regiments nearly completed, while General Banks could report the
addition of twenty one more regiments, three of which contained a.
thousand men each. These regiments included practically all of the
material then available. 28 Since there was little or no distinction
between the troops recruted under the two generals, Brigadier-Gener-
al ullmann' s special ;owers for organization of black regiments was
revoked, and he was ordered to report in his capacity as brigadier-
general of volunteers to Maj or-General Banks. 2 ^
In September these troops were inspected by Generals Lr rant and
Thomas. The latter directed the filling up of the regiments, if suf-
ficient recruits could be brought in from Texas. It was hoped that
30twenty five thousand men might be enrolled in all.
27. ibid., p. 704.
28. War Records, Serial No. 41, p. 688.
29. ibid., Serial No. 124, p. 766.
30. ibid., p. 769.

Along the Mississippi organization was proceeding in somewhat
irregular fashion. General Thomas had authorized the enlistment of
negroes for some twenty regiments, and at various points along the
river were to "be found the nuclei of these organizations. Some were
growing steadily, some were practically at a standstill. The work
needed systematizing. It had begun well enough but there was no
coordination between different officials who were carrying out Gener-
al Thomas' orders, ana the success or failure of each regiment de-
pended to a large degree upon the character of the officer directly
in command.^1
In the late summer and fall of 1865, after the fall of Vicksburg
and Port Hudson, and the consequent opening of the river, a fresh
attempt was made to raise colored troops. -eneral "homas proceeded
to Vicksburg, and announced his purpose of enlisting all able bodied
male negroes who came under the protection of the Federal Government.
But the negroes had been driven back for many miles on both sides of
the river, and could be got only as expeditions were sent out. Con-
sequently his work was limited chiefly to the reorganization and fill
ing up of old regiments. 32
In Kentucky new problems were faced. Under the militia act of
July 1862, and the enrollment act of March 3, 1862, free colored men
were not exempt from enrollment, and they became subject to the draft
laws. 3s So strong was the opposition in Kentucky to the proposition
of Provost Marshal General Fry to include free negroes in the enroll-
31. H. G. Pearson, James S. Wadsworth of ueneseo , 242.
22. 'War Records, Serial o. 124, 686, 739.
33. Supra. Chapterll.
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ment of June 1863, that General Burn side, commanding in the depart-
ment , and others of his generals sent protests and warnings to head-
quarters. The people of the State were quite willing to make up the
entire number of the draft from tine white population: they had no
objection to the use of slaves as laborers, but did rebel at the idea
of their enlistment as soldiers. In spite of the protests the en-
rollment was carried out, but in the year 186 3 no negro troops were
recruited in the State. 24
In January, 1664, General Thomas attempted to induce Governor
Braraletteto support him in the recruiting of negroes, 1 fter some
investigation, he satisfied himself that Kentucky negroes, free and,
slave, were being enticed in large numbers to neighboring states, and
that many were enlisting. He urged their organization within the
state as infinitely preferrable; but the Governor was fearful of the
evil effects of such a measure. The State was much agitated over the
slavery question, and he hesitated to undertake any steps certain to
provoke more dissatisfaction. Successful operations were so improba-
ble that General Thomas withdrew from the State for a tune. "
In other sections of the country, the organization of colored
troops was being carried on under the direction of a Bureau for the
Organization of Colored Troops, 'i'he Bureau was established in the
Adjutant-General's office, May twenty-second, 1863. Under the super-
vision of this board all matters concerning negro troops were to be
regulated. Recruiting was restricted to persons especially examined
and approved by a special board, and arrangements were made for the
34. War Records, Seerial No. 124, pp. 416, 418-419, 420.
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examination of all applicants for positions as officers in colored
regiments .
^
6
In view of General Thomas' activities in the West and South,
the attention of the Bureau was turned to the Eastern and 1 iddle
States. The first regiment to be recruited under their direction
was within the District of Columbia. Colonel William Birney received
his instructions to organize the regiment on June thirteenth, 1863,
and "by the thirtieth of the month the regiment was complete and mus-
tered into service. A second was at once begun.^
June seventeenth, Major George S. Stearns was appointed recruit-
ing commissioner for United States Colored Troops. He made his head-
quarters at Philadelphia, where recruiting was at once begun under
the supervision of a committee of patriotic citizens. Two full regi-
ments and part of a third were completed by the end of October. 5°
Major Stearns was an aggressive worker. He succeeded in raising by
subscription $J>0,000 for trie organization of colored troops. Con-
vinced by a trip through the South that Maryland would prove a suit-
able field for recruiting, he urged the appointment of officers for
that State.^ August thirteenth, he received instructions to go to
the Department of the Cumberland to aid in recruiting colored troops
there, under the general supervision of General Thomas. After his
departure from Pennsylvania, enlistments then were carried on under
the Provost-M arshall General.^
Almost simultaneously with the commencement of operations in
Pennsylvania, Governor Todd of Ohio was granted tne authority he
36. War Records, Serial 11 o. 124, x>, 215.
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asked for the organization of a colored regiment, ar;d to Governor
Smith of fthode Island was given authority to raise first a company
and then a battalion of colored artillery. Delaware, Iowa, Illinois,
Wisconsin and Michigan officials received similar authority, and
late in the year or early in 1864, recruiting was begun in New Hamp-
shire, Connecticut and New York. Governor Andrews of Massachusetts
received special permission for the organization of a battalion or
regiment of cavalry. In the Virginias, and Carolinas, Major-General
Foster of the Department of Virginia, General Gillraore of the Depart-
ment of the South, and Provost-Marshal-General Fry shared the re-
41
sponsibility of the organization of colored troops.
Meantime, in the border States the problem was being worked out
in some confusion and unrest. In Maryland the recruiting was being
carried on under Major-General Schenk, in Tennessee by Mai or Stearns,
and in Kentucky and Missouri by General Thomas. The three faced
much the same problems, and the most important of these was the ques-
tion as to the position of slaves of loyal owners.
Slaves of loyal as well as of disloyal masters flocked to the
Union lines. It was long an undecided question as to the legality
of enlisting them as volunteers, or subjecting them to the draft.
Either policy caused resentment on the part of their masters. ihe
opinion of Judge Advocate General Holt was asxed on the matter, and
in a letter of August twentieth, 1865, he made his reply to Secretary
Stanton
.
42
41. ibid., pp. 229, 372, 380, 383, 678, 838, 563, 572,
1096, 1117, 887, 1183.
Serial No. 45, p. 732.
42. Y/ar Records, Serial No. 124, pp. 695-696.

55
Ke based the right of the Government to employ, for the sup-
pression of the rebellion, persons of rfrican descent, on two
grounds, the right to use then a3 property, the right to use them as
persons anxious to serve their Government. As to the first he said,
"Both our organic law and the usages of our institutions under it
recognize fully the authority of the Government to seize and apply
to public use private property on making compensation therefore.
What the use may be to which it is applied does not enter into the
question of the right ot make the seizure, which is untrammeled in
its exercise save by the single condition mentioned." He continued,
"Secondly, agF persons, while those of African descent held to service
or labor in several of the States occupy under the laws of such State
the status of property, they occupy also under the Federal Government
the status of persons. They are referred to eo nomine in the Consti-
tution of the United States, and it is not as property but as persons
that they are represented on the floor of Congress, and thus form a
prominent constituent element alike in the organization and in the
practical administration of the Government." Under the law of July
seventeen, 1862, and the enrollment act of March three, 1363, Judge
Advocate Kolt felt that the Government had every right to use slaves
of loyal masters. He stipulated that a compensation, sufficient to
entirely exhaust the interests of the claimants should he made for
every slave taken into the service.
Unfortunately the Government did not immediately announce its
intention of adopting such a policy, and meanwhile recruiting offi-
cers were causing much complaint by accepting such persons, and even
by impressing them. Governor Bradford of Maryland took the matter
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up with President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton early in September,
They were at the time unwilling to say that it had "been decided to
enlist slaves of loyal owners, Tout the practice continued neverthe-
less. 43 Conditions in Tennessee were worse if anything. When Major
Stearns arrived early in September, he found the recruiting going
on in an irresponsible way, any officer who wanted them, impressing
the negroes on his own responsibility. 44 Two regiments had been
raised. Major Stearns stationed the recruiting agents whom he had
brought with him at various promising points and directed recruits to
be sent to Nashville. It was part of his plan to have the officer
who was to command a regiment appointed first, that he might shape
and tone the regiment from the beginning. 40
By October first it was decided that the best results would be
obtained in the organization of colored troops if it was made a defin,
ite part of the plan to take slaves of loyal masters. Accordingly
General Orders Number 329, issued from the War Department October
third, contained the following provisions. 4 ^
"Free persons and slaves with the written consent of their own-
ers, and slaves belonging to those who have been engaged in or given
aid and comfort to the rebellion, may be now enlisted, the owners who
have not been engaged in or given aid to the rebellion being entitled
to receive compensation, as hereafter provided.
If within thirty days from the date of opening enlistment, no-
tice thereof and of the recruiting officers being published, a suffic
ient number of the description of persons aforesaid to meet the ex-
igencies of the service should not be enlisted, then enlistment may
be made of slaves without requiring consent of their owners; but they
may receive compensation as herein provided for owners offering their
slaves for enlistment.
Any citizen of said States who shall offer his or her slave for
enlistment into the military service shall, if such slave be accepted,
43. War Records, Serial No. 124, p. 787.
44. ibid., p. 840.
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receive from the recruiting officer a certificate thereof and become
entitled to compensation for the service or labor of said slave, not
exceeding the sum of ^300, upon filing a valid deed of manumission
and of release, and making satisfactory proof of the title."
There were further provisions to obviate the possibility of any
loyal master being deprived of his slave without compensation, and
to make it equally impossible for any disloyal master to receive
compensation, Under this order, which was subsequently extended to
other Slave States, recruiting was carried on until the end of the
war
.
In Missouri, affairs had followed much the same course. In
July of 1863, General Thomas gave instructions for the formation of
the first colored reeiiment within the State. The first regiment was
promptly recruited and a second begun. So far there had been little
trouble, since every effort had been made to respect the State
laws. But someone, whose identity remained unknown, appointed re-
cruiting commissioners and sent them into Missouri with copies of the
orders held by the officers of the first regiment. These men made no
attempt to discriminate between the slaves of loyal and disloyal
masters, enlisting any negro then could induce to follow them. With
their departure it became apparent that most of the slaves who re-
mained belonged to masters whose loyalty was not certain. It was
advised that a general enrollment be made, with compensation to loy-
al owners. 47 General Orders Number 329 was extended to Missouri,
and with slight modifications it became the basis for enlistment of
colored troops within the State, until the summer of 1864 when the
supply was exhausted
47. War Records, Serial No. 124, p. 847.
43. ibid., pp. 1009, 1021-1022, 1034.
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Kentucky was the last of these Border States to submit to the
recruitment of negro soldiers. General Thomas' attempt of the summer
of 1863 has been mentioned. In April of the next year Brigadier-
General Burbridge, then in command of the department assumed the
superintendence of the raising of troops in Kentucky. Negroes were
to be enlisted by persons specially authorized and sent to Louisville
or the nearest instruction camp. The plan of organization was practi-
49
cally that established by General Order Number 329.
General Thomas was still at the bead of the recruiting in the
West however, and it was to bim that complaints were made of cruel
practices upon the slaves either by their masters or recruiting
officers. It was reported that the owners of slaves who offered
themselves for enlistment and were rejected because of physical dis-
abilities, often treated the unfortunate servants almost savagely,
and to remedy this, no slave who was fit for any form of military
service in the Quarter Master's Commissary's Department was afterward
rejected. Such men were assigned to so called "invalid" regiments,
50
which were utilized for garrison and fatigue duty. w
General Thomas somewhat brusquely superseded General Burbridge 's
orders by a system of his own, but by orders from the War Department
he was obliged to recall them, and leave matters in General Bur-
bridge's hands. It was evident that two systems could not be in op-
eration at the same time without leaving openings for abuse of
authority, irregularities in enlistment and similar undesirable prac-
tices- Enrollment continued with comparative success. Host of the
49. War Records, Serial No. 125, p. 233.
50. ibid., pp. 422, 429, 764.
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negroes from towns and adjacent country were recruited, but interior
districts still abounded in lukewarm loyalists who exerted them-
selves to retain their slaves. 1
It must not be thought that the problems of organizing negro
troops were all settled once tne men were enrolled. At least two
more questions remained to be fought out, one the problem of their
families, the other the problem of payment.
The importance of the first of these was early recogniged, and
in March 1863, a Freedman's Inquiry Commission was appointed to in-
vestigate the conditions of the colored population emancipated by
the President's proclamation of .January first, and to report what
measures would best contribute to their protection and improvement.
The great colored population thrown on the War Department for pro-
tection and disposal made necessary the procuring of accurate inform
ation as to their condition, and the establishing of practical meas-
ures to make them self supporting and to prevent industrial disturb-
52
ance
.
The Committee made its report in June after extensive investiga
tion especially in the East and South. 53 They reported that the re-
fugees should not necessarily be a burden upon the Government for
more than a brief period. There was on the other hand every reason
to believe that they might become with wise supervision efficient
auxilliaries in prosecuting the war. The commission recommended two
things to remedy the situation, first, regular work and wages for
older men and women and children, i'or the able bodied males they
51. ibid., pp. 429, 468, 1017-1018.
52. War Records, Serial No. 124, p. 73.
53. ibid., pp. ^30-454.
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advocated military training as the most effective scheme for improv-
ing them and at the same time making them useful to the Government.
They laid much stress on the necessity for humane and just treatment
of the refugees. *t was proposed that "contraband camps" be mere
places of reception and distribution. The working of the abandoned
plantations was recognized as a suitable employment, but it was
urged that they be put to work where they might receive regular
wages, and where if possible they might buy small lots. It was ad-
vised that tnese organizations be kept entirely apart from the mili-
tary camps.
These recommendations were generally followed. It was soon
evident that the recruiting of negro troops could never be a success
until the men were assured of the welfare of their families. Camps
were established along the Mississippi, in the South and the East.
In Virginia and North Carolina "suitable sustenance" was assured to
the family of every colored soldier so long as he behaved well in the
service. Should he desert, the support of his family was stopped.
Lest laziness should be encouraged, it was further provided that
where a family was able to work and failed to do so, it should re-
ceive no Government aid.^
The rules adopted in the .Department of the Gulf have already
been cited. The most elaborate scheme was put into practise along
the Mississippi. Planters were required to keep a roll of the per-
sons employed upon their estates, and to record the same with the
provost-marshal of the district. If possible, they were to secure
unity of families among their employes. All questions between em-
54. War Records, Serial No. 124, pp. 1139-1144.

ployer and employee were to be settled by the provost-marshals of
the district, and flogging and other cruel punishments were forbid-
den. Soldiers were allowed to visit the camps only with special
permission and never with firearms. For the further protection of
the contraband unauthorized purchase of clothing and other property
from the laborers was forbidden. So too was the sale of whisky and
drugs. There was provision for medical care, and what is especially
"noteworthy, at least one school for colored children under twelve
years of age was to be established in each provost-marshals district?
In conjunction with .this determination to better the social
status of the negro, to put his family on a sound economic basis,
Congress in March of 1865, passed a law freeing the wife and children
of any colored man who had been mustered into service. This supple-
mented the law of 1862 which gave freedom to the families of colored
56
soldiers, provided they belonged to rebel masters.
In the matter of payment the negro soldier was discriminated
against until near the end of the war. According to the provisions
of the act of July seventeenth, 1862, he was to receive only ten
dollars a month and one ration, and three of the ten dollars were to
be devoted to the purchase of clothing.
"his discrimination was more unfortunate in its effects upon the
earlier recruits than upon later ones. The earlier recruits expected
to receive the same amount as white soldiers. General Saxton's in-
structions specifically stated that his negro troops should "be
entitled to, and receive, the same pay and rations as are allowed, by
55. ibid., Serial Ko . 125, pp. 165-168.
56. War Records, Serial Wo. 125, p. 1228.

law, to volunteers in the service." ' when instead they received
only seven, mutiny threatened. One non-commissioned officer was
shot by order of courtmartial for leading his comrades to stock arms
before their captain's tent, on the grounds that the Government's
refusal to meet its obligations, relieved them of their contract.
Desertions were frequent, and the morale of the troops was lowered?
3
The effect of the discrimination was always bad, though in lat-
er days it was fully counted upon by the negroes. It led to a feel-
ing of inferiority on their part which operated against their im-
provement. It destroyed much enthusiasm for recruiting, and the re-
sult was that many more negroes desired positions in the Quarter
Master's Department where pay was regular and high. Realization of
these facts slowly forced itself upon the minds of Congress and in
June 1864, a law was passed which equalized the pay of white and
colored troops. It was retroactive as far as January of 1864.
Even in the matter of bounty the colored troops had been at a
disadvantage. No bounties had been paid, to either slave or free
colored persons, in the case of slaves, the master received the
bounty, one hundred dollars, if the man was drafted, three hundred if
he went as a volunteer, The act of June fifteenth provided for the
payment of a bounty not to exceed one nundred dollars to be mustered
into the service, and to all those drafted under the call of October
seventeenth 1863. A final provision authorized the Attorney General
to examine into the laws with the purpose of ascertaining whether or
not free colored men were entitled to enter the military service of
57 . Supra.
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the United States on April nineteenth, 1851, on an equal footing
with white troops, should the point "be settled in the affirmative,
^9
all bacic suras were to "be paid oyer to any authorized claimant. w
Attorney General Bates promptly gave his opinion in favor of the re-
funding of money to all colored men who had "been free April nine-
teenth, 1361, and the order was immediately issued by Secretary Stan-
ton. 6 <>
It remained for Congress to .justify one more claim, that of the
men of General Hunter's and General Saxton's regiments, and somewhat
belatedly they did so in an act of March eighth, 1865, which pro-
vided that they should "from the date of their enlistment, receive
the same pay and allowances as are allowed by law to other volunteers
in the military service.
Less than two months later, April tewnty-ninth, 1865, the re-
cruiting of negro troops was ordered to cease, and did at once stop
except in the State cf Kentucky where it was -prolonged a few weeks in
the hope of favorably influencing the Legislature toward the accept
-
ance of an emancipatory amendment to the Constitution.
In all, one hundred eighty-six thousand, seventeen colored men
were mustered into the service. Louisiana had the highest number to
her credit, a little more than twenty-four thousand, but Tennessee
and Kentucky with twenty and twenty-three thousand respectively
followed her closely. Mississippi came next in the sc&le with more
than seventeen thousand. Maryland, Pennsylvania and Missouri with
between eight and nine thousand each formed the next class, and be-
59. War Records, Serial No. 125, p. 448.
60. ibid., pp. 490-493, 565.
61. ibid., p. 1222.
62. war Records, Serial No. 125, p. 1271.

low them the state rosters showed from forty-seven in Texas to five
thousand, seven hundred fifty-three in Virginia. A little consider-
ation of these facts makes clear two points, one, the difficulty of
recruiting, and second the disastrous effect upon the South "by this
extensive withdrawal of her laboring population
.
5S
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lUimber of Colored Troops by r-tates.
Maine 104
N. H 125
Vt 120
R. I 1,837
Mass 3, 9 66
Conn 1, 764
N. Y 4,125
N . J 1,165
Pa 3, 716
Del 954
Md 8, 718
D. C 3,269
Va 5, 723
M. G 5,0 39
W. Va 196
b . C» •••..i..5, 462
G-a 3, 462
Fla 1, 044
Ala 4,969
Miss 17,869
La 24,052
Ky 23,703
Term 20, 133
Ark 5, 526
i: ich 1,387
Ohio 5, 392
111 1, 537
Ind. 1,811
Mo 8,344
Minn 104
Iowa 440
Wis 165
Kens 2, 060
r, ex 47
Col. Terr 95
At large 733
Not acc 1 t for5, 083
Officers. . . . 7, 122
186,017

iIV
EEGRO TROOPS IB ACTION.
»ould the negroes make good soldiers? Even their most stead-
fast friends would scarcely have given an unanimously affirmative an-
swer, and many who felt the possibility of training free negroes of
the North, had little confidence in the capacity of an ex-slave to
acquire the high degree of discipline necessary to the successful
soldier. It did not seem probable that men who had been for years,
and whose .ancestors had been for several generations in the degrad-
ing position of slaves, with all that meant of dependence, submission,
absence of personal initiative, should in a few weeks or months de-
velop the fearlessness, steadiness and settled purpose without which
the soldier becomes not an aid but a menace to his cause.
But slavery had instilled some lessons of value to the prospec-
tive soldier. The negro knew the meaning of obedience to authority,
and much waiting upon the will of others had taught him patience.
There were inherent in the race certain characteristics which made
him quickly responsive to military life, and more than one young
officer who felt his spirit sink at first sight of his motley horde
of wouldbe-soldiers , was surprised into honest admira.tion by the ra-
pidity of their transformation. One officer describes the first meet*
ing of his company as follows: 1 "I reported for duty and was assigned
to my company. I well remember the sight that greeted my eyes the
next morning when I went out to roll call. The Company had been re-
cruited almost entirely from Fort 1'egley at l ashville, Tennessee,
where they had been working on the fortifications; and were in charge
of a colored man who had been a sort of overseer there. .Jrawn up in
1. Norton, Colored Troops in the 'war of the Rebellion, Glimpses of
— the Nations 8 1 ru^le . ~ ] 1 iftn Series. 67.

two ranks, without regard to size, dressed in all sorts of illfitting
garments, they waited with curiosity the appearance of their Captain.
Although the roll call developed the part that I had such illustri-
ous men as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, William Henry Harri-
son, and others of equal note, yet, 1 confess that ray ardor was a
little dampened, and I thought to myself, here is the ra.w material
with a vengeance. Judge, then, of my surprise, when I found that in
the school of the soldier without arras, they were already quite pro-
ficient, for they had "been marching to and from their work, and with
their natural aptness to imitate, they had learned various movements
of the company, which they were able to execute very creditably. I
found them eager to learn, very attentive and enthusiastic."
This "aptness to imitate", this eagerness to learn, combined to
make the colored recruits master the drill very rapidly. Colonel
Thomas Wentworth Higginson, who commanded the first South Carolina
regiment remarked the same thing. "To learn the drill," he said,
"one does not want a set of college professors, one wants a squa.d of
eager, active, pliant school "boys; and the more childlike these
pupils are the better. There pis no trouble about the drill; they
will surpass whites in that." Another trait which helped in their
adaptation to a new life was the inborn love of show and glitter.
They delighted in the ceremony of military regulations, and they
kept their arms and accoutrements in an irreproachable state of
cleanliness and brightness. Their very names were evidence of this
delight in ostentation and provided a very acceptable touch of humor
in camp life. "'Dwelling in tents, with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.'
This condition is certainly mine, --and with a multitude of patriarchs
beside, not to mention Caesar and Porapey, Hercules and Bacchus," says
Colonel Higginson in his diary,'3
The pride which made the men so careful of their appearance had
another good effect. It tended to do away with many of the planta*
2. T. W. Higginson, Army Life in a Slack Regiment, 10.
3. ibid., 19.
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tion trickeries common among the race. The new sense of importance
and responsibility made the men exact in the fulfillment of their
duties. There was less tendensyaraong them to connive at small of-
fences than among white troops. quarreling and drunkenness were less
common among them than with other troops also.
Another element of importance in the negro make-up, was their
emotionalism, '^hey were easily stirred to great fervor, quickly
moved "by the example of their officers. Their capacity for religious
enthusiasm is generally recognized. Something of the same sort of
firy zeal was stirred in them in this struggle for freedom. It was
a powerful stimulus to the negro troops to know that they were having
a part in the establishing of their race on a new plane. Certainly |
no section of troops had greater reasons for a desire to serve faith-
4fully and well. The importance of this factor did not receive its
proper valuation in the minds of many of the opponents of the plan
for arming colored men.
But although it was soon "beyond question that the colored troops
were capable of performing successfully the ordinary routine duties
of camp life, it still remained to he proved that they could fight.
Possibly the first encounter between the rebels and their former
slaves, certainly one of the earliest, was on St. Simon's Island off
the coast of Georgia, in August ofl862. The island was occupied by
some five hundred colored persons, abandoned and runaway slaves. To
this island for garrison purpose's was sent the one remaining company
of the ill-starred Hunter regiment. Before their arrival they iis-
4. Sutherland, The Negro in the Late War, War Papers read before
the Commandery of Wisconsin, I, 179-187.
C. Saxton, Moors' 8 Rebellion Records, VI, Diary, 33. and
G. W. Williams, History Negro Troops in the Civil War, 346-7.
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covered that a body of rebel guerillas were on the island and the
naval commander at the station offered Captain Trowbridge the oppor-
tunity to lead his colored soldiers in their pursuit, i f he felt that
they could be trusted to maintain a steady front against the rebels.
Trowbridge was glad of the chance to try his men. They went ashore,
ohly to discover that the black men of the island had already under-
taken the project. A party of about twenty five negroes led by one
of their own number, John Brown, had armed themselves and begun the
pursuit of the rebels. During the ensuing skirmish, John Brown was
shot, very probably the first colored man who fell under arras in the
war. Trowbridge immediately threw his soldiers into the aid of the
negro band. After a pursuit of more than a week the rebels made their
escape. But Trowbridge was satisfied that negro troops could fight
as well as drill, and some such notion had been introduced into the
minds of the escaping rebels, to judge from a letter of their leader
in which he suggested to a friend that "If you wish to go to hell be-
5
fore your time, go to St. Simon's and be hunted ten days by niggers.
The South Carolina regiment, or rather Captain Trowbridge's com-
pany, was sent on another expedition along the Georgia and Florida
coast in the first week of November. The purpose of this expedition,
as General Saxton himself admitted, was as much to test the fighting
qualities of the negroes as it was to break up the rebel stations
along the shore. It was a highly successful experiment. The men
showed courage and coolness. Perfect familiarity with the region
fitted them particularly for such a form of fighting as the location
made necessary; sudden landings, short raids on the rebel posts, and
5. T. W. Kiggmson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, 274-275.

return to their vessels. November twentyfifth he reported the suc-
cessful conclusion of a third expedition, this time composed of three
companies of the First South Carolina Regiment, concerning their
behavior he said:
"They fought with the most determined bravery. Although scarce-
ly one month since the organization of this regiment was commenced,
in that short period these untrained soldiers have captured from the
enemy an amount of property equal in value to the cost of the regi-
ment for the year. They have driven back an equal number of rebel
troops, and have destroyed salt works along the whole line of this
ooast . "
^
During this trip the menloaded two steamers with lumber under
galling fire from the concealed enemy. It was a two days ,iob, and
during that time the men worked almost without intermission, "hey
were short of provisions, but made no complaint. Troops who could
stand without flinching in the face of such conditions were not to be
dismissed as of small military value. They kept up this record of
efficient service in subsequent expeditions of one sort or another.
The most noteworthy of these took place in March, 1863, when Colonel
Higginson and his men occupied Jacksonville, Florida.
A lthough these events seem very small in comparison with the
great movements of the war, tney were actually of no small importance
in determining the future policy of the Government with regard to
colored troops. r1 he men had displayed ability to oppose an enemy
without flinching. In the occupation of Jacksonville , their self-
control toward their former masters was put to the test, and they m
met it well, They were thoroughly imbued with pride in their charac-
ter as soldiers, and maintained their good behavior almost without
exception. For the first time too, wnite and black soldiers served
6. War Records, Serial Ho. 20, pp. 189, 191.
7. War Records, Serial No. 20, pp. 192-19 3.
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together on regular duty, and the possibility of unprejudiced coop-
eration was made evident. a
The colored brigade organized under Generals Butler and Banks
took part in the siege of Port Hudson in the early summer of 1863.
The men had long desired some such opportunity to prove their cour-
age. When after months of drudgery, guarding railroads, building
forts, and other fatigue work, they received the order to leave Eat-
on Rouge and march to Port Hudson, they were overjoyed, General
Banks says in his account of the siege:
"On the 27th of May a desperate attack upon the works was made.
The attack upon the right commenced with vigor early in the morning.
Had the movement on the left been executed at the same time, it is
possible the assault might have been successful Cn the
14th of June a second general assault was made During the
siege, the colored troops held the extreme right of our line on the
river, and shared in all the honors of the 27th of Hay and the 14th
of June, sustaining at other times several desperate sorties of the
enemy, particularly directed against them, with bravery and success."
Speaking at another time of the colored troops he said:
"I think it may be said with truth that our victory at Port Hudson
could not have been accomplished at the time it was but for their
assistance .
"
One of the regiments lost heavily. Of its five hundred members, thir
ty one were killed, one hundred fifty wounded and ninety reported
missing. y In almost every ba.ttle in which they took part the negro
losses were proportionately heavier than those of the white, due to
the reluctance of the South to take colored prisoner. Thirty or for-
ty percent was not an unusually high rate of loss. -he negroes well
understood what capture meant and fought with a ferocity that length-
ened their casualty lists correspondingly.
8. T. W. Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, 94, 109, 118.
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At almost the same time the negro troops at Mllikens Bend, just
above Vicksburg on the Mississippi , were making a gallant defense
against a much superior Confederate force. The entire Union force
amounted to about fourteen Hundred. Of these the greater number,
more than twelve hundred, were raw, half trained colored troops. Yet
in spite of this double disadvantage in numbers and training the Con-
federate forces were beaten back. It was a long hard struggle. The
negroes fought with extreme bitterness and their losses were propor-
tionately heavy. Hand to hand fighting of the fiercest sort marked
the battle and proved the audacity and reckless daring of the negro
soldiers. it was the more remarkable in view of the fact that they
had been armed for the emergency within the week, and from General
Grant on down through the roster of army officers, they received the
heartiest sympathy and admiration for the exploit. his battle was
instrumental in revolutionizing whatever spirit of antagonism toward
colored troops still existed in the army. 10
The assault upon Fort Wagner is probably as famous as any of the
battles in which colored soldiers played a prominent part. The fifty
fourth Massachusetts figured in the assault under the leadership of
its gallant young colonel Robert Gould Shaw. The regiment left its
post on James Island on the evening of July eighteenth, From that
time until the assault of Fort Wagner11 two days later, they had
practically no time for rest, and their rations were restricted sim-
ply to the amount they had with them. General Strong put them in the
10. :/[oore, Rebellion Records, VII, Documents, 12-13.
ibid., 14-15.
Furness, The Negro as a Soldier, Military Essays and Recollec-
tions, II, 474-477.
urant, Memoirs, I, 544.
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place of greatest honor and greatest danger, the head of the assault-
ing column. x'hey made a brilliant charge in the face of a concen-
trated fire, and scaled the walls, Colonel Shaw at the head of his
men. As he stood erect to urge the men on, he was shot and fell with,
in the fort. The colorguard was almost wiped out, and the losses
among non-commissioned officers was great. With the loss of their
colonel the regiment was obliged to fall "back. The extreme bitter-
ness of the South toward the North in its use of colored troops was
given significant expression at Fort Wagner* According to the state-
ment of a Union soldier who was captured the morning after the as-
sault, Brigadier-General H apgood, commanding the Rebel forces, said,
"I knew Colonel Shaw before the war and then esteeiTied him. Had he
"been in command of white troops, I should have given him an honorable
burial. As it is I shall bury him in the common trench, with the
negroes that fell with him". He doubtless would have asked no better
resting place than among the men who had followed him so enthusiastic
ally, and who had shown their mettle in many incidents of individual
daring . lx
In May of the next year General wild's black regiments, two of
infantry and a battery of artillery, defended Fort Powhatan against
an attacking rebel force, in what is known as the battle of Wilson's
Wharf. Two assaults were steadily thrust back, and the Confederate
forces finally drew off. General Wild pays a special tribute to the
work of his pickets and skirmishers, and had no complaint to make of
any of his colored troops who "stood up to their work like veterans."
11. Shaw, Robert Gould Shaw, Kavard Memorial Biographies, II,
205-210
.
M oore, Rebellion Record, VIII, Documents, 216.
ibid., VII, Incidents, 63.
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At the "battle of Petersburg June fifteenth, 1864, they won new
applause and new respect by their "brilliant action. General W. i1 .
Smith's corps was ordered against the town, and the brigade of col-
ored troops under General Hicks made the first advance, clearing a
line of rifle pits "by a "bayonet charge. Unfortunately, the assault
so well begun was not immediately pushed to a successful conclusion,
and by the next day rebel re-enforcements had arrived. Ihe attack
was renewed next day, and the colored troops were again sent in to
the attack, '^hey fought with determination, taking the redoubts a-
gainst which they were sent. During the day they were subjected to
that severest of tests of endurance, a long period of inaction under
enemy fire, but their response to the signal for advance when it fin
ally came was not less immediate or vigorous because of the wait.
The arrival of re-enforcements for the Confederate obliged Grant to
settle down to siege operation. It was during this siege that the
great Liine disaster took place. By the explosion of a mine a road
was opened into the rear of the rebel works. But hesitation and a
last minute change of plans by which the negro troops who had been
specially trained for tne service were held back, and a white div-
ision sent in to le a<i the attack, proved fatal to the execution of
the plan, 'when they were finally sent in, the crater opened by the
explosion was filled with a disorganized mass of men, and the rebels
had recovered sufficiently to begin a counter attack, ^hey went in
witn spirit, and seemed to have behaved exceptionally well in spite
of the chaos in which they were obliged to fight. ince however the
Confederate had rallied and encircled the trench, nothing could make
the attempt to force a way into the city anything but a miserable
a
7 4
failure
.
12
In Virginia too, colored troops were fighting their way into
favor. At Deep Bottom, in August of I860, and in the attack on .New
Market Heights a month later, they fully sustained the reputation
which had been made for colored troops at Port Hudson and Milliken's
Bend. The latter struggle was particularly "bloody-- and casualties
were heavy. In his report to Secretary Stanton, General Butler said
that the colored troops "carried intrenchments at the point of the
"bayonet that in a former movement accross the river stopped double
their number. It was most gallantly done with most severe loss.
Their praises are in the mouth of every officer in this Army. Treat
ed fairly and disciplined the;y have fought most heroically." De-
scribes the "battle field to his wife he wrote:
"Poor fellows, they seem to have so little to fight for in this
contest, with the weight of prejudice loaded upon them, their lives
given to a country which has given them not yet justice, not to say
fostering care I have not "been so much moved during the
war as I was by this sight. Dead men, and many of them I have seen,
alas! but no such touching sight as this. Their valor had just been
reported to me, and I rode through the evidences of it and over the
strong position which they had cleared for me." 15
The battle of Nashville on December fifteenth of 1864, furnishes
another instance of splendid action on the part of negro troops.
Many of them had never before been in actual battle but they faced
the new experience with fortitude and daring. In speaking of the
casualties resulting from the day's conflict, Major-General Steedman
12. G. V. vvilliams, History of Negro Troops, 336-338, 145.
Dana, Recollections of the Civil V/ar, 220.
War Records, Serial To. 12. p. 723.
Moore, Rebellion Records, II, Documents, 571.
13. Butler, Private and Official Correspondence, V, 215, 191-192.

said
:
"The larger portion of these losses, amounting in the aggregate
to fully twenty five percent of the men under my command who were
taken into action, it will he observed fell upon the colored troops.
The severe loss of this part of my troops was in their brilliant
charge on the enemy's works on Friday afternoon. I was un-
able to discover that color made any difference in the fighting of
my troops. All, white and black, nobly did their duty as soldiers,
and evinced cheerfulness and resolution such as I have never seen
excelled in any campaign of the war in which I have borne a part."
Here is evidence enough that there was true soldier-stuff in
the black race. That the negro regiments have left no greater mark
than they have in the reports of battles, is due not to inefficiency
and cowardice on their part but to the fact that they were so exten-
sively used in purely fatigue operations, where labor was plentiful
but glory seldom wa . llegro troops guarded railways, repaired
bridges, built and rebuilt fortifications and garrisoned posts. T o
such an exorbitant degree was this sort of demand made upon them,
that General Thomas, felt it necessary to take steps against its con-
tinuance in the West and South, and June fourteenth, 1864, he sent
out orders to trie effect that they sould be asked to take only a fair
share of fatigue duty with white troops. This was a natural enough
trend for the question to take. The negroes were already ufficient-
ly trained in such forces of labor. -heir ability was not quest-
ioned. Furthermore, the opposition to their use in such pursuits
was much less than to putting them into actual military operations.
General Thomas Was not the only champion of the rights. Brigadier-
General Ullmann made the same complaint and begged that so unfair a
15
condition might be remedied.
14. V,rar Records, Serial No. 95, pp. 508, 519.
15. War Records, Serial No. 125, pp. 431, 764.
Serial No. 124, pp. 1126-1128.

The white troops of course were only too glad of the opportunity
to thrust fatigue duty on the black troops. A letter from a colonel
in General Rosecran's army gives a fairly clear insight into the
transformation which made white troops warm advocates of the use of
negroes. 1 ^ "1 want to say a word about darky soldiers. You pro-
bably know more about their fighting than I do, but I am satisfied
they will fight like tigers when properly managed, but a more useful
attachment to a post than a regiment of them was never made. We
have a regiment here, First Mississippi, and without them it would
have been impossibl e for us to do all the guarding and fatigue. They
relieve us of" fatuguing duty entirely, and have built some fine
breastworks besides. when soldiers see them hard at work in the hot
sun, doing what they would otherwise have to do, the 'opposition'
and 'prejudice* to the place disappear."
In the ^ulf and Seaboard States there was more excuse for this dis-
crimination against the negroes. The malarial swamps were disastrous
to the white troops and it was a practical necessity that they be
relieved from fatigue duty so far as possible. According to the re-
port of Medical Inspector Townshend, the proportion of white soldiers
affected with malarious diseases such as fevers, dysentery, neuralgia
and rheumatism was ten and eight tenths percent, wnile colored sol-
diers were effected only to the extent of eight tenths of one per*
17
cent
.
It is not attempted to claim too mucn for the colored troops.
If they were more subject to discipline, more docile and amenable
than the whites, they were infinitely more dependent upon their offi-
cers in battle crises. Without the constant example and the direct-
ing forces they were helpless. If they could be roused to an extreme
pitch of enthusiasm for the length of a charge, tney lacked the power
to persist in the face of defeat. 'here was about them a childlike
quality, an immaturity of mind which made them more subject to states
17. War R e cords, Serial l^o. 124, p. 454.
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of depression and weakness. An officer in one of tine South Carolina
poets, submitted a list of questions to a number of officers who had
used negro working parties, in an endeavor to discover just how white
and negro troops did compare. To the first question, as to their
comparative courage under fire, all replied that the "black was more
timorous than the white, hut mere easily controlled "by his officers.
They agreed too, that the negro was less skillful than his white
comrade, out fully competent for most sorts of siege work. As to
the amount of work done, the "black was superior, "because he worked
more steadily. v.here haste was necessary for the immediate comple-
tion of an important hit of labor, white troops were to be preferred,
because of their better conception of situation.
The point on which the colored troops were least satisfactory,
was about the only one concerning which their capacities had not beer-
questioned prior to their arming. They did not have the physical en-
durance that was expected of them. Although they were less suscep-
tible to malarial diseases, they fell victim much more easily to
others, and once ill, they had no skill in caring for themselves.
They became despondent and hopeless more quickly, and gave in to dis-
ease simply from lack of determination to recover. The dogged re-
sistance and persistance which dominated the Anglo-Saxon had no place
in the negro teraperment. The undue share of fatigue duty which fell
upon them had evil physical effects, and lowered their morale by
19keeping c instantly before them the sense of inferi on t.y;
18. War Records, Serial No. 46, p. 328-329.
19. T. W. Kigginson, Array Life in a Black Regiment, 55, 250, 262.
Sutherland, The Negro in the Late 'war, vVar Papers read before
the Commandery of Wisconsin, 1, 180-182.
Armstrong, Samuel Chapman Armstrong, 109.
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The cause for which they fought did much to counteract these
weaknesses, and tie horror which swept over the South at the pros-
pect of meeting colored troops roused a certain odd pride. Where
their emotions and affections could he appealed to, the negro proved
a highly successful coldier. In the excitement of bsttle he charged
with firy purpose and certain effect. In camp life he was the most
social and lighthearted of companions. The comparative ability of
free Northern blacks or Southern plantation negroes was frequently
argued. To the credit of "both classes, commanders in practically
all cases preferred the type with which they had served. The North-
ern negroes were more independent, more educated for the most part,
and snowed a quicker intelligence. On the other hand the Southern
"blacks were fighting to win the freedon which their ) orthern comrades
already enjoyed. To them failure meant relegation into a slavery
worse than that which they had known, and from wnich escape would he
forever impossible. It was a stimulus sufficiently strong to bring
out the best they had to give. This class of negro soldiers far out
numbered the free colored troops, of course, and upon their success
or failure, depended the success or failure of the movement.
That it was a success no one would question today. They re-
lieved white troops from service in malarial districts, They per-
formed much of the menial labor for which the most patriotic soldier
has ro predilection, they garrisoned post after post, thus freeirg
white soldiers for active warfare, and when the opportunity was Riven
them they fought with a courage which comparisbn with their Anglo-
Saxon comrades does not dim.
-
-
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V
NEGRO TROOPS AHD THEIR RELATIONS TO TEE SOUTH.
Some suggestion has "been made of the attitude of the South to-
ward negro troops, hut a fuller discussion of the point is necessary
to a cle:.r understanding of the problem of negro troops in the Civil
far
.
It was a common practice for Southerners to take their "black
servants with them into camp, where they acted not only as body ser-
vants, but were put to work in 1 *rge and semiorganized gangs to build
fortifications and do any other sort of tie avy labor of which they
were capable. It was the most natural thing in the world for the
slave holder to transfer to ais servants the unpleasant and irksome
fatigue duties in which camp life abounded. But if it were occasion-
ally proposed that they be armed as soldiers, it was only with the
intent of insulting the Yanxee, by suggesting that the negro was his
equal on the battlefield, or to irritate the Abolitionist by show-
ing aim that trie slaves were quite willing to fight for their mas-
ters. It must be remembered then, that although as early as June
twenty-eighth, 1861, Tennessee passed a law permitting the organiza-
tion of free colored persons, and even authorizing their impressment,
should the number of volunteers be insufficient, they were not to be
armed, and the sole purpose of their organization was to relieve
white troops from menial duties.*
1. G. W. Williams, History Negro Troops in the Civil War, II, 182.
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When in the North it was proposed to arm the negroes for active
military service, the entire South was swept by a wave of indignant
protest. It seemed nothing less than a direct invitation for servile
insurrection, and probably no v»ords had a more sinister sound in
Southern ear than those. The proclamation issued by Jefferson Davis
as a result of General Hunter's and General Phelps' activities in
raising colored troops^is a clear indication of the anger and detest-
ation which fired the South. The passing of the second Confiscation
Bill had been received with bitterness, but the storm it aroused was
insignificant in comparison to the one stirred up by the adoption of
the policy of arming negroes. There was no intent to submit meekly.
If the North employed such means of warfare it should pay as heavily
as possible. This passionate resentment was not simply the uncon-
trolled outburst of the people. The Confederate Government shared it
to the last degree, and had no hesitation in pursuing the policies
advocated by its constituent.
hb early as November fourteenth, 1862, Brigadier-General Here*'?
of the Confederate Army reported the capture of four negroes in fed-
eral uniform, and asxed v/hat measures were to be taken toward them.
Through the Secretary of War the question was submitted to President
Davis. The latter advocated their execution as an example and warn-
ing to all colored troops, and in the hope of deterring negroes from
further enlistment. This was the order sent back, with the minor
limitation that orders for the execution of slaves found in arms a-
gainst the South should be given only by the general commanding in
locality. 1" In accordance with this policy, a proclams.tion of Presi-
2. Supra, Chaptei IV.
3. War Records, Serial No. 117, pp. 945-946, 954.
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dent Davis, issued to the Southern armies as an order December
t wenty-fourth, 1862, besides repeating the provision for the execu-
tion of all commissioned officers found leading or organizing colored
troops, provided that all negro slaves captured in arms he at once
delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States
to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said
States. 4 From the Southern point of view this was an admirable meas-
ure. It did not commit the Government to the recognition of colored
men as soldiers and it insured stern punishment, for by the laws of
any seceded State, such negroes were guilty of inciting servile in-
surrection and subject to the death penalty.
A law published as General Order Number 25 for the Confederate
forces, on March sixth, 186:5, conflicted to some extent with this
earlier ena.ctment. 5 According to its provisions, all slaves captured
from the enemy were to be sent to depots established for that purpose
in the various States. From these posts discriptive lists were cir-
culated in the newspapers, ana slave owners who had lost any of their
negroes were permitted to make inspection for the discovery of their
lost property. Upon due proof, slaves were immediately returned to
their masters. It is not difficult to understand the feeling which
prompted these Acts. The Southerner who put a colored Union soldier
back into slavery was only repossessinghimself of property which he had
lawfully held and which he felt had been unlawfully taxen away from
him. It ie equally clear that the North could not permit such treat-
ment of its forces, and out of this situation grew a new point of con-
troversy between the section.
4. War Records, Serial No. 21, p. 907-908.
5. ibid., Serial No. 116, p. 844.

April thirtieth the law of March sixth was definitely suspended,
except as it covered non-combatant slaves, by a joint resolution of
the Confederate Congress, which practically duplicated the Presidents
order of December twenty-fourth, and was therefore extremely harsh
in its provisions, It amounted to the authorization of the execu-
tion of all colored troops and their officers. 6 Under these laws no
distinction was made between the free negroes of the North and the
ex-slaves, nor was there a difference in the treatment actually
accorded them during the earlier months of the War.
Cne instance in particular involving the treatment of free .
negroes showed the attitude of the South in its most unprepossessing
light. Two colored boys, sitizens of Massachusetts, and acting as
servants to the colonel and staff of a Massachusetts regiment, were
taken prisoners and sold into slavery.^ The boys were both born free
in Boston, and the grandfather of one had served in the Revolution.
Nothing coulo excuse their enslavement, ana the effect of such an
incident upon the North boded no good to the South.
There was little uniformity in the practice of Southern command-
ers. Kirby Smith advised his subordinates to avoid complications by
taking no colored prisoners*^ This brutal policy did not receive the
approval of Secretary of war Seddon, who with unconscious irony re-
commended that they sould be received with mercy and returned to theii
owners. ^ He steadily advocated this as preferable to turning them
over to State courts and the provisions of trie .joint resolution of
6. ibid., p. 9 40.
7. War Records, Serial No. 118, p. 455.
8. ibid., Serial No. 119, p. 22
9. p. 115.
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April thirtieth, were for the most part quietly disregarded. Wherev-
er possible slaves were returned to their masters. The free negro
remained a vexatious problem. On one point only was their unanim- .
ity of feeling and action. Uo colored soldier was to be regarded as
a prisoner of war.
In the meantime the Federal Government and its generals were
searching for some means to protect negro troops and force the South
to recognize their status as soldiers. Vwo plans suggested them-
selves. The first was retaliation. May twenty-seventh, General
Hunter asked that prisoners taken by the tfavy might be held as host-
age for the safety of negro troops ana their officers. July second,
General-in-Chief Kalleck announced himself in favor of retaliati on
,
1(
and July thirtieth President Lincoln issued a retaliation order. It
was couched in the quietly simple language so customary in his pub-
lic utterances, and stated the purpose of the Government "to give
protection to its citizens of whatever class, color, or condition,
and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the
public service." There was notning indefinite about the threat of
retaliation
.
"The Government of the United States will give the same protec-
tion to all its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any
one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retalia-
tion upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession:
It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United
States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall
be executed; and for everyone enslaved by the enemy or sold into
slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor in the public
works, and continued at such labor until the other shall be released
and receive trie treatment due to a prisoner of war."
10. ibid., ferial No. 118, p. 712.
Serial No. 119, p. 73.
11. Lincoln, works, Federal Edition VI, 330.
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The first part of the order was not effective, for the reason
that the Federal Government hesitated to put to death innocent men
for the misdeeds of others, and without absolute and certain proof
that the alleged offenses had been committed. So although, the sus-
picion was often too strong to rest well under that name, that negro
soldiers soldiers had "been unlawfully put to death, it was usually
so difficult to establish that fact beyond doubt that retaliation by
death penalty was very seldom resorted to.^ secorJ d part of the
order was however promptly put into effect, and proved a fairly pow-
erful instrument to prevent negro soldiers from being put to work on
exposed fortifications under the fire of their own guns, and to save
1 "2.
them from similar horrors.
The Confederate Government was decidedly embarrassed by the re-
taliation policy of the North. Their men inevitably paid the penalty
of outrages against colored troops, and the South faced the alterna-
tive of backing down from the harsh measures they had made law, or
seeing their own men face the same sort of treatment, ^'he result
was that the Confederate States courts in many ca.ses refused juris-
diction over the negroes handed over to them, and it was almost im-
possible to obtain criminal trials. In view of this difficulty the
War Department was induced to modify the proposed action against such
negroes, and distinguish between the free Northern negroes, and those
whose former slavery could be established. The former class, instead
of being punished under the la.w of April tnirtieth were disposed of
12. War Records, Serial No. 38, pp. 589, 425-426, 444.
ibid., Serial No. 119, pp. 177, 189, 289, 960, 258-259.
13. ibid., pp. 188.
Serial No. 66, pp. 90, 280. Serial No. 88,
p. 459.
Serial No . 120, pp. 967-969, 987, 990-993, Serial No. 89, pp.
216-217, 285.
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under the provisions of General Crder Number 25. The free negroes
were kept in strict confinement. ri'hey were not recognized as prison-
ers of war, hut "except in some trivial particulars indicative of
inferior consideration" were treated much in the same manner as the
other captives. Public Opinion was gradually swerving in favor of
their recognition as prisoners of war.
There was a second reason for this change,, the way in which the
North met the problem of exchange. The South could mot of course ex-
change negroes without recognizing them as soldiers. This it was de-
termined not to do. Tne North was equally obdurate in demanding their
exchange without discrimination. In August, 1863, the matter was
argued by the Confederate Commissioner for exchange Robert J. Culd,
and General Meredith representing the federal Commissioner, Major-
General E. A. Hitchcock.^ in hie report to General Hitchcock, Gener-
al Meredith says, "To my demand 1 that all officers commanding negro
troops, and negro troops themselves, should be treated as other pris-
oners of war, and be exchanged as sucti, ' Mr. Quid declined acceding,
remarking that they(the rebels) would 'die in the last ditch' .before
giving up the rignt to send slaves back to slavery as property re-
captured, but that they would be willing to make exceptions in the
case of free blacks." No agreement was reached. he Confederates
were willing to exchange officer for officer and man for man except-
ing officers ond men of colored troops. ^his exception meant a
practical abandonment of colored troops, and was a step quite out-
side the limits set by Federal honor.
14. war Records, Serial No. 120, pp. 703-704.
15. Serial No. 119, p. 226.
, „ , J
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.hen the intention of the South regarding negro prisoners "be-
came known, President Lincoln sent an order to Commanders in the
field to make no further exchanges, without orders from the War De-
partment. This policy met objection in the North. J he stopping of
all exchange meant increased suffering and anxiety in many homes, and
protests poured in. But the effect on the North was not to he com-
pared with that in the South. To the Confederacy it was a two edged
sword. hey were obliged to furnish provisions for all the Union
prisoners left on their hands, a.nd it required an embarrassingly
large number of men even to guard them. In the poverty stricxen
state of that section, such a burden seemed appalling, liven worse
than this was the fact that the South' s man power was becoming low,
and it was more than disheartening to have thousands of ablebodied
soldiers helpless in Northern prisons. 16 The North with her greater
resources could afford to hold obstinately out for her first proposi-
tion. The South was further embarrassed by the appointment of Gener-
al Butler as a commissioner of Exchange. He was still outlawed by
President Davis' proclamation of 1862, a fact which interferred with
1
7
direct communication between him and Confederate officials. The
question of exchange remained in this contested state until the Spring
of 1865, when the Confederacy was in its last gasp. Until that time
no exchanges were made, and by that time it was too late for exchange
to be any considerable benefit to the South. February eighth the
Confederate Congress passed a resolution so amending the act of April
thirtieth 1863, as to remove most of its objectionable features, and
16. War Re cor as, Serial No. 119, p. 609.
Serial : o. 120, p. 20 2.
17. ibid., p. 990-991.
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communications on the subject of exchange were successfully revivea.
The South has been charged with great barbarity in its treat-
ment of colored troops. In .iust what degree tfrose charges are true
or false it is impossible to discover. For almost every assertion
of inhumanity there is an indignant denial, and in the majority of
cases, those denials come from Confederate uenerals whose honor even
the North hesitated to question. That there were occasional and
even frequent acts of cruelty toward the negroes cannot be denied,
but there is reason to believe that such acts were generally per-
formed without orders and by the lowest class of soldiery. There
was undoubtedly a tendency to strike hardest at the colored troops.
The negroes realized for their part, the dangers which they faced
and seldom asked for quarter. It is no excuse for the atrocities
which did occur that they were comparatively infrequent.
The Confederates were charged with murdering wounded negroes
after engagements, with putting them to hard labor on fortification,
where they were half starved and flogged upon the slightest provoca-
tion. There were stories of crucifixions, and burnings, and of the
burial of still living men. 19 'he massacre at Fort Pillow, on the
fifteenth of April, 1864, was too big an affair to be absolutely de-
nied, but not too big to be much controverted, . According to the
testimony of Union soldiers, it was treacherous and barbarous from
beginning to end. The Confederate troops after long nd unsuccess-
ful assaults were brougat into a new and advantageous position which
18. w.ar- Records, Serial No. 121, p. 197.
19. Jar Records, Serial No. 86, p. 745.
Serial No . 119, p. 843.
Serial o. 170, pp. 459-460, 876.
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they had not previously been able to attain, under a flag of truce.
Upon the refusal of a peremptory demand of surrender, the Confeder-
ates made their assault from the treacherously gained positions of
vantage, and the Union troops, realizing the impossibility of furth-
er defense threw down their arms in surrender. 'A he signs of sub-
mission went unheeded, lien were shot and clubbed to death in a
passion of hatred, until of the five hundred members of the garrison,
three hundred of whom were colored troops, scarcely more than sixty
j
remained. The survivors told tales of unbelievable cruelty practiced
by the rebels, tales too horrible for repetition. The Confederate
version bears little resemblance to this. According to their ac-
counts General Forrest and his attacking party were guilty of no
violations of the rules of war. The garrison by its refusal to sur-
render and subsequent failure to hand down its colors, making itself
liable to just the punishment it received. General Forrest's report
of the assault, written about two days after it, rather belies the
calm statements made later. .He says, " The victory was complete,
and the loss of life will never be known from the fact that large
numbers ran into the river and were shot and drowned. The force wa.s |
composed of about 500 negroes and 200 white soldiers (Tennessee
Tories). The river was dyed with blood of the slaughtered for two
hundred yards The approximate loss was upward of 500 killed, but
few of the officers excapmg It is hoped that these facts will
demonstrate to the "Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope
with Southerners." The only o^uestion is as to the degree of brutal
ity exercised, and the evidence is heavily in favor of the Unic
version of the story. 20
20. War Records, Serial To. 57, pp. 519-610.
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In view of the opposition to negro tro ..ps so long maintained by
the South, the determination of the Confederate Government to put
colored troops into the field during the last months of the war, is
incontrovertible evidence of the extremities the Government had
reached
.
By an act of Pebrusry seventeenth, 1864, free negroes between
the ages of eighteen and fifty were held liable to the performance of
certain military duties in the way of work upon fortifications, or
preparation for materials of war, or in military hospitals. Bat by
February of the next year there was need for the instant reenforce-
ment of general Lee's pitiably reduced army. But one resource re-
mained, and to that resource the government turned, althoup;h still
apprehensive of the evil effects it might have upon the rem.nant of
the rebel forces. March thirteenth, 1865, "An' Act to increase the
military forces of the Confederate States" was approved. It provided
"That if, under the previous sections of this Act, the President
shall not be able to raise a sufficient number of troops to prosecute
the war successfully _Jid maintain the sovereignty of the States and
the independence of the Confederate States, then he is hereby author-
ized to call on each State, whenever he t ranks it expedient, for her
quota of 300,000 troops, in addition to those subject to military
service under existing laws , or so many thereof as the President may
deem necessary for t;ie purposes herein mentioned; to be raised from
such of the population irrespective of color, in each State, as the
proper authorities thereof may determine . "21
21. War Red orda, Serial No . 126, p. 711-712.
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The plan for organization, was the consolidation of the regi-
ments of ten companies aa they existed in their weakened state, into
six companies, and the addition of four companies of colored troops.
Such an arrangement would preserve the identity of the old regiments.
Kow successful such a scheme would "be, the South was not given oppor-
tunity to prove, for the surrender of the rehel armies in 1865
followed so closely upon the legislation authorizing negro troops,
that no colored soldiers were recruited under it.
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VII
CONCLUSION.
Abraham Lincoln spoke of the arming of the blacks as a measure
"indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the
preservation of the nation." "Indispensable to the preservation of
j
the Constitution", a broad expression certainly, yet the study of the
problem does not tend to make it appear an exaggeration. Arming the
blacks adaed one hundred and eighty thousand men to the National
Forces, and reduced the laboring force of the South by the greater
part of that number. They volunteered when misfortune and disaster
were haunting the Union cause, they fought in the face of probable
reenslavement and cruel punishment, They were cheerful under monoton
ous and inglorious fatigue duty, Discrimination in payment and in-
sulting aspersions upon their manhood were borne patiently. In
battle they fought courageously. They lifted a race in the estim-
ation of a Nation, and proved to the world that in the Federal Union
Democracy still lived.
j
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